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PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? 
LABOR UNIONS, TAX POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL VOICE EQUALITY 
PHILIP T. HACKNEY† 
“The function of democracy has been to provide the public with 
a second power system, which is an alternative power system, 
which can be used to counterbalance the economic power.” 
E.E. Schattschneider 
INTRODUCTION 
Labor unions are weak politically and continue to decline in 
number and political power in the United States.1  Many contend 
that this is a positive development for the country because they 
believe labor unions cause economic harm.2  Others see this loss 
as unfortunate and harmful because the decline of labor comes 
 
† James E. & Betty M. Phillips Professor of Law, Louisiana State University 
Law Center. J.D. LSU Law Center, LL.M., New York University School of Law. A 
big thanks to the LSU Law Center for a grant making this work possible, and to my 
research assistant Vivian A. Jeansonne. I also thank the participants in the 2016 
Junior Tax Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Critical Tax Law 
Conference, the participants of the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the students and 
faculty at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Advanced Topics in 
Tax Policy Colloquium of Fall 2016, and the students and faculty of University 
California Irvine School of Law Current Issues in Tax Policy and Law Colloquium. I 
especially thank Alice Abreu, Pippa Browde, Neil Buchanan, David Cameron, Adam 
Chodorow, Charlotte Crane, David Elkins, Lilian Faulhaber, Jon Forman, Daniel 
Hemel, Sarah Lawsky, Francine Lipman, Omri Marian, Goldburn Maynard, Philip 
Postlewaite, Emily Satterthwaite, Erin Scharff, Walter Schwidetsky, and Manoj 
Viswanathan for their thoughts on earlier versions of this paper. 
1 Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political 
Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1638, 
1641 (2014); PHILIP YALE NICHOLSON, LABOR’S STORY IN THE UNITED STATES 279–
36 (2004) (anecdotally detailing the declining power of unions from 1968–2004); KAY 
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE 
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87–94 (2012) [hereinafter 
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS]. 
2 MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST OF LABOR LAW 
187–88 (1987); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 
280–94 (1967). 
FINAL_HACKNEY  12/18/2017  9:27 AM 
316 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:315   
with a reduction in working class benefits and opportunities, and 
also because it exacerbates economic inequality.3  These forces 
battle over policies focused on the ease of union organization and 
maintenance such as right to work laws and union shops.  While 
these are important policies for labor union power,4 this Article 
examines labor union tax treatment instead.  The Article focuses 
primarily on whether we should grant exemption from federal 
income tax to these interest groups, but also considers whether 
labor union members should be allowed to deduct labor union 
dues.  In evaluating these questions, this Article focuses on the 
value of groups in our democracy in a social choice function 
model, rather than on the economic benefits of labor unions in a 
social welfare function model.5  A review of labor union tax 
treatment suggests that we systematically undermine the 
important voice of labor in our democracy.  This Article proposes 
some changes to tax policy related to labor unions as a result of 
this review. 
In this Article I consider two somewhat divergent income tax 
policies: the tax treatment of labor union income and the 
deductibility of labor union dues.  The first raises the issue of 
whether we should tax the economic activity of a particular legal 
business entity.  The second raises the issue of whether certain 
individual expenditures should offset income for tax purposes.  
Both issues raise, as a primary matter, whether the expenditures 
or income represent “real income.”  I argue labor union revenue 
is real income, and that therefore its exemption should be 
justified by some policy goal.6  In other words, there is nothing 
special about the income earned by labor unions that makes it 
entitled on its face to exemption from income tax.  Conversely, 
 
3 Jordan Brennan, United States Income Inequality: The Concept of 
Countervailing Power Revisited, 39 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 72, 72–73 (2016). 
4 Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When Government Subsidizes Its Own: 
Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
896, 896 (2015). 
5 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY 20–21 (1989) (discussing the different possible constructions someone might 
mean by political equality, with one focused on maximizing a social welfare function, 
and another primary theory focused on maximizing a social choice function). 
6 See generally Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About 
Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013) [hereinafter Talk About Tax Exemption] 
(arguing that all mutual benefit organizations, such as labor unions, should be 
presumed to be taxable unless there is a strong policy reason for subsidizing the 
activity). 
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because labor union member dues payments represent an 
amount that reduces income of the labor union member, we 
should allow the deduction in the ordinary course of business 
unless there is a legitimate reason for not allowing that 
deduction.7 
In evaluating these two policies, I adopt a social choice 
function model.  Under this model, we should maximize the 
number of individuals who have an opportunity to express their 
voice to influence our democracy.  As a very simple and 
incomplete example, if there were 100 people in a particular 
democracy, and we said that only 25 had the ability to influence 
the final decisions, a policy that increased that number of 
individuals to 30 would improve the social choice function.  The 
incompleteness of the example is the question of the quality of 
the voice.  If the new five now speaking are only reiterating the 
voice of the 25 already speaking, then there is no real 
enhancement to social choice function.  In this Article, I struggle 
to assess when social choice function is enhanced by this policy 
but do my best to suggest a way through the problem with the 
limited information at our disposal. 
Importantly, the influence at issue in political voice is more 
than an opportunity to vote for representatives; it includes the 
opportunity to engage in policy discussions and influence final 
decisions on governmental policy.  As I will develop in the Article, 
in a large and modern democracy, a polyarchy, the primary 
means of obtaining political voice for most citizens is through 
interest groups.  Thus, the question becomes, where we can 
identify a group that suffers from a particularly weak political 
voice, should we and could we consider enhancing that political 
voice through public policy. 
When viewed through this social choice function model, it 
becomes difficult to justify current policy regarding the 
deductibility of union dues.  Under the tax law, an employee can 
only deduct unreimbursed business expenses to the extent they 
exceed two percent of her adjusted gross income.  Because labor 
 
7 Although labor union dues are generally considered a deductible trade or 
business expense under 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014) of the Code, because labor 
union members are employees they are typically unable to deduct labor union dues 
either as an above the line deduction under 26 U.S.C.A. § 62 (West 2014), or as an 
itemized deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012); instead they generally may deduct 
these expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent those 
amounts exceed two percent of the members adjusted gross income. 
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union dues are considered unreimbursed employee business 
expenses, union members are rarely able to deduct them.  A 
business owner generally faces no such challenge in deducting 
his own association dues.8  Given the political voice inequality 
that exists between these two classic interests in favor of the 
businessman’s political voice, it is hard to justify making that 
differential worse through the tax system.  To improve the social 
choice function, we should at the least make the two deductions 
equivalent by denying or allowing both.  I explore the pros and 
cons of these choices in Part VI. 
The case of tax exemption for labor unions is more complex 
under this social choice function model.  It depends on other 
policy choices made.  For instance, if other interest groups are 
provided tax exemption—the current status quo—then the case 
for labor union tax exemption is overwhelming.  It is only fair to 
extend the exemption to labor interests if business interests 
benefit from the policy.  Denying labor exemption would decrease 
the social choice function by reducing the voice of labor in a 
relative sense, compared to other political voices that the policy 
would enhance, such as that of business. 
However, labor interests are better off in a state where all 
interests are taxed.  The problem of collective action makes it 
more difficult for large, relatively poor, and less skilled interests 
like labor to form, as compared to smaller, wealthier, more 
skilled interests, like those that form in the business context.  In 
other words, exemption as a benefit is much more likely to be of 
assistance to business interests in any case than labor interests.  
Many business interests get a windfall from this exemption from 
tax.  Taxation is likely to be more of a hindrance to the better 
capitalized business interests.  Based on this, I argue the social 
choice function would be increased under this taxable state 
because labor interests, as a relative matter, would not 
experience the same type of reduction in voice as would other 
more powerful interests who would now have to pay tax on  
 
 
8 Some have objected that this is a much broader problem. We widely make it 
difficult for all employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses. The 
fact that labor union members are unable to deduct their dues is simply a narrow 
instance of this problem. I argue later in the Article that the labor union case is 
more significant because of its direct impact on political voice. In other employee 
business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore. 
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income.  Thus, we could improve our current tax policy simply by 
rescinding tax exemption for both labor and business interests, 
and maybe others as well. 
Finally, the collective action challenge of labor in theory and 
practice is so severe that a policy of tax exemption for labor 
interests alone could be justified as a modest attempt at righting 
political voice equality in our democracy.  In a social choice 
function sense, providing a subsidy to labor interests, while not 
providing the subsidy to others, like business interests, could 
bring more voices into the political debate.  However, as will be 
developed below, the case for this is not strong.  The policy 
instrument provides meager support and is not well-tailored to 
accomplish this purpose. 
Our current tax-exemption system9 generally allows any 
group that wants to form a non-profit organization to form and 
obtain tax-exempt status.10  For instance, Congress exempts 
many special interests from federal income tax, such as trade 
associations, social welfare organizations, and labor unions.11  No 
one has offered a strong theory supporting this policy to subsidize 
groups that work to influence our political system.  Given the 
attempts we make to limit the ability of interest groups to 
influence our elections and policy generally,12 this choice is odd.  
While providing charitable organizations a subsidy can be 
justified in part on the fact that they provide public benefits, 
labor unions are little involved in provision of direct public 
benefits.  As mutual benefit organizations, they look to advance 
their members’ interests through negotiating with management 
and seeking their wants through the political process. 
To evaluate the idea of tax exemption generally as it applies 
to labor unions, I consider the major non-profit tax-exemption 
rationales.  I find them important, but unsatisfactory, because 
 
9 26 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2014). 
10 There are limits of course. A particular company cannot form a business 
league to support its own product. It must instead form to support a line of business. 
None of the tax-exempt interest group organizations can engage primarily in 
political campaign activity. 
11 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4)–(6) (West 2014). These are respectively social welfare 
organizations, labor organizations, and trade associations. Although the Code refers 
to labor unions as labor organizations, I will refer to “labor unions” in the rest of the 
paper. 
12 ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 2–6 
(2005). 
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they all fail to consider the important value of political voice 
equality.  Market-failure theory suggests we should subsidize 
organizations that offer goods or services subject to market 
failure.13  While we can show a market failure in the case of labor 
interests generally, the theory fails to tell us what type of market 
failure is necessary to justify the subsidy.  Government failure 
theory suggests we allow nonprofits to provide collective goods 
and services that the government fails to provide.14  This theory 
focuses on goods and services that are not critical to the 
functioning and decision-making of the government itself.  
Interest groups, however, are fundamental to the government 
structure itself.  Government failure theory fails to consider 
whether there might be a different quality and importance to 
such services.  Pluralism theory considers the deeply political 
nature of much of our nonprofit tax exempt sector; it contends 
that we should exempt nonprofit organizations from tax to 
facilitate democracy.  The central idea of this theory is the more 
political voices we highlight, the better off our democracy.  The 
theory, however, fails to consider that many nonprofit interests 
face little to no collective action problem.  Those organizations 
with greater wealth and skill are likely to face less of a collective 
action problem and also more likely to draw a greater return 
from the subsidy.  Thus, the subsidy will work to enhance the 
voice of those already strong.  This enhancement is likely to work 
to drown out weaker voices. 
There are many theoretical or functional lenses through 
which we could view these nonprofit organizations.  We could 
look at the impact they might have on our economy in a 
functional sense such as how the presence of labor unions impact 
the distribution of resources.  We could then assess in a 
theoretical sense whether the presence of labor unions results in 
a more fair distribution of resources.  However, I contend that 
viewing them through a functional lens, such as viewing them in  
 
 
13 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations 
from the Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–70 (1981) (most clearly 
articulating contract failure theory). 
14 Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a 
Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21 (Susan 
Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) (most clearly articulating government failure theory). 
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their interest group role, and through a theoretical lens, such as 
the governance role they play in our democracy, provides the 
most significant and important insights to our tax policy. 
I have previously examined tax-exempt business leagues 
through the lens of interest group literature.15  An interest group 
is “a collection of individuals or a group of individuals linked 
together by professional circumstance, or by common political, 
economic, or social interests” that satisfies three requirements: 
(1) the organization is not a political party, that is, the name of 
the organization does not appear on a ballot; (2) it uses some of 
its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or executive 
decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized 
outside of the government it intends to influence.16  Viewed as an 
interest group primarily, we can see that business leagues do not 
face significant collective action problems and cannot be shown to 
face some other significant market failure to warrant tax 
exemption.17  Just as a matter of its place in the marketplace, 
there is no indication that there is any general lack of business 
interest groups. 
Labor interests are also interest groups, but they present a 
different case.  Theory suggests a large, latent interest like that 
of labor should experience high difficulty in organizing to provide 
the collective goods of representation before government and 
bargaining with employers.18  Evidence shows that labor is highly 
underrepresented politically.  In a study from 2001, labor made 
up only one percent of the interest group sector.19  That was 
compared to business nonprofit interest representation of twenty 
percent, and business corporations at thirty-five percent.  There 
is, thus, evidence that a severe market failure hinders labor from 
representing itself in the market and before government in a 
comparative sense.  This suggests that current tax exemption 
policy generally has it backwards.  Instead of providing every 
group exemption we should tailor exemption only to those groups 
 
15 Philip T. Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) 
Trade Associations Are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 265, 269 
(2015) [hereinafter Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus]. 
16 JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, 
CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 22–23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
17 See Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15. 
18 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 57–59 (20th prtg. 2002) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE ACTION]. 
19 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl.11.3. 
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that really need the assistance.  Additionally, generally denying 
labor union members the ability to deduct union dues is likely to 
directly harm political voice equality where business interests so 
readily have access to that deduction.20 
This Article contributes to the tax legal literature by 
providing an analysis of labor unions and how we tax them.  
Although labor unions as a whole are a very small part of our 
economy and tax system, by looking at one narrow section of the 
tax-exempt sector we can shed light on the rest of the exempt 
sector.  Additionally, although most tax policy scholarship 
focuses on one of three values—equity in an economic sense, 
efficiency in an economic sense, and administrability—I focus 
primarily on the value of equity in a governance sense.   
I argue that, at least in the sphere of tax where tax choices 
directly impact our democracy, we should take into consideration 
values of democracy.  In that sphere, we should not adopt tax 
policies that increase political voice inequality.  Also, it is 
reasonable to adopt tax policies that increase the equality of 
political voice.  Because I find that our current taxing system of 
interest groups broadly increases political voice inequality, I find 
our tax system wanting and make recommendations for change. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I covers the tax 
treatment of labor interests.  Part II begins to build a social 
choice function model by sketching the case for democracy and 
thereby political equality.  Part III completes the social choice 
function model by highlighting the role of groups such as labor 
unions within a democracy and evaluates the role groups play in 
the matter of political equality.  Part IV describes the history and 
tax law of labor unions.  Some who are unfamiliar with the tax-
 
20 When looking at a tax subsidy, it is important to consider whether the person 
who is named as the beneficiary of the deduction will be incentivized by that 
deduction. That question is the question of who receives the incidence of the subsidy. 
That question depends on the elasticity of a union member to paying union dues. 
Given the substantial challenge in organizing unions, it seems likely that, at least as 
an initial matter without the consideration of any other laws, labor union members 
are highly elastic as to whether they will pay union dues or not. Their return is 
unclear and is often unlikely to exceed the annual cost. Where there is a union shop, 
however, that requires union members to pay union dues whether they want to 
belong or not, the answer is obviously different. Nevertheless, the primary other 
party that might receive the incidence of the money gained through the deduction 
would be the union itself, meaning that the question of who gains the incidence of 
the deduction does not matter if all we care about is whether the policy would 
increase union activity or not. 
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exemption requirements of labor unions might want to jump to 
Part IV.B for a discussion of that area of the law first.  Part V 
assesses theories regarding the rationale for exempting nonprofit 
organizations.  Part VI analyzes the implications of democratic 
group theory for the tax treatment of labor interests. 
I. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TAX TREATMENT OF LABOR 
INTERESTS 
This Part looks at the technical tax treatment of labor union 
income and the payment by members of labor union dues.  There 
are three primary types of labor union income: (1) member 
income, (2) nonmember income, and (3) investment income.21  An 
initial question is whether the “income” exempted is “real 
income” that should in the ordinary course of an income tax be 
taxed.  Because there appears to be a real transaction in a 
commercial space between individuals and a legal entity to 
acquire services or goods from that entity, the income exempted 
seems to be real income that should ordinarily be taxed in our 
economy; any decision to exempt that income should be 
supported by a policy intended to incentivize this activity.  Labor 
union dues are considered at the end of this Part. 
A. Member Income 
Labor union members pay member dues to the union.  Those 
dues entitle members to certain rights and benefits that have a 
value.22  For instance, in exchange for the dues, the union might 
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the employees and 
might also defend an employee who has a dispute with 
management.  In effect, the labor union provides services to its 
members in exchange for a fee just the way a health club 
provides services to its members in exchange for a fee.  Because a 
labor union is a separate legal entity from its members, this 
transaction should result in income to the labor union for the 
purposes of the income tax. 
 
 
21 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 268. 
22 Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 354 (1976) 
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U.S. tax law treats a corporation as a legal entity that is 
separate and apart from its members.23  Under that theory, when 
a member pays dues to a union in exchange for certain goods and 
services he is dealing with a legal entity that is separate from 
himself.  Generally, our income tax law has treated such a 
moment as a moment to recognize income for tax purposes.24  
However, some do not accept member dues as income of the 
nonprofit.25  They argue that the nonprofit corporation is no more 
than a place where nonprofit members are pooling income to do 
things nonprofit members could do on their own.  The idea is that 
neighbors A, B, and C could pool money to construct a tennis 
court.  A, B, and C would then each pay the costs of maintaining 
the court.  We should not suddenly tax A, B, and C as an entity 
simply because they are carrying on activity together.  Utilizing 
this characterization to describe a large complex organization 
like a union that is an interest group delivering collective 
benefits seems questionable.  The key aspect of interest groups is 
that they form because no member could provide these collective 
goods and services on his own.  The entity and collective action of 
members joined together is necessary for its power.  There is a 
real difference between the member and the organization. 
Even if you accept the pooling income argument, not all 
member income is easily placed into that category.  When a 
union sells goods or services that are not core goods or services of 
the union, we might think of this income differently.  Thus, 
where a union sells education, insurance, or death benefits to its 
members, we might think of it differently than when it sells 
collective bargaining with an employer.  In the end, unions sell 
 
23 See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
24 However, there is a real question as to why we would apply a tax to a 
corporate entity. A corporate entity is a legal fiction, after all. I take a look at that 
question in Talk About Tax Exemption, supra note 7. There I argue that the two best 
theories are the shareholder theory that holds we tax corporations to tax the 
shareholders, and the real entity theory that suggests the corporation is a thing that 
has power that can be regulated through taxation. Both of these theories could 
arguably apply to a labor union, making it a good subject of taxation. 
25 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 343 (discussing the idea that 
we might view church congregations as only pooling resources rather than selling 
services); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and 
Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW 451, 455, n.6 (2014) (discussing that legislators adopted 
the tax exemption scheme for social clubs in order to not impose harmful tax 
consequences on those who choose to pool their resources together to engage in 
recreation); Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 
133, 134 (2006). 
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services that differ little from normal business activity that we 
apply the income tax to in most other situations.  Members pay 
dues to acquire collective bargaining with an employer, magazine 
subscriptions, management grievance protection, and some 
lobbying and political activity.  We should justify why we would 
diverge in income tax treatment for this type of financial 
arrangement. 
B. Nonmember Income 
A union generates nonmember income when an individual 
who is not considered to be a member pays the union for goods or 
services.26  For instance, some unions sell health insurance to 
those who are not members of the union.  This type of sale 
results in nonmember income to the union.  The union realizes 
income to the extent the amount paid exceeds the costs of that 
good or service.  Most theorists consider this income as income 
that should be taxed in a normal income tax system.  Exemption 
of this income is effectively a subsidy to the union to the extent 
we do not tax it.  With other mutual benefit nonprofits—social 
clubs, for instance—Congress rightly taxes such nonmember 
income.27 
C. Investment Income 
Investment income is the return from stocks and bonds or 
other capital investments.28  Most theorists also accept the 
exemption of this income as a subsidy to a nonprofit 
organization.  An individual cannot generally invest income and 
avoid the income tax on the return from that investment.  In 
effect, allowing tax exemption for a particular purpose allows the 
creation of a communal tax-free investment vehicle for that 
purpose in the same way we allow individuals to establish tax-
free savings vehicles for retirement or education for their 
children. 
 
 
26 See Halperin, supra note 25, at 136. 
27 26 U.S.C. § 513 (2012). 
28 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 293. 
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D. Impact of Tax Exemption 
The regime of tax exemption encourages a nonprofit to hold 
earnings beyond a taxable period.  This is because tax exemption 
only provides a subsidy to the extent there are earnings and 
those earnings are not immediately spent within a particular 
taxable year.  Additionally, exemption primarily provides a 
benefit of the deferral of tax, rather than permanently exempting 
income from tax.  Union expenses are generally deductible unless 
they are used for lobbying or political activity.  To the extent that 
the union holds earnings from one year to the next, the main 
issue would be that the union was able to deduct the amount 
early.  Of course, this does not take into consideration the 
different tax rates involved between union members and the 
corporation, or different tax rates over time, or the fact that 
union members change over time. 
If a union were taxable, it could avoid tax, or at least lower 
its taxable income, by ensuring revenues and expenses closely 
match.  This may be difficult for a union because they typically 
act in part as an insurance service to the extent they hold strike 
funds or provide other insurance-like benefits to members.  
Additionally, any organization that is looking for stability values 
maintaining some savings.  Thus, many unions would likely hold 
some percentage of profits into a future year. 
E. Taxation of Union Dues 
A union member’s payment of dues generally is a deductible 
business expense.29  However, most union members are unable to 
deduct this amount.  Union dues are a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction.30  Such a deduction can only be deducted to the extent 
all similar deductions exceed two percent of the individual’s 
adjusted gross income.  For instance, a union member with 
$60,000 in adjusted gross income can only deduct union dues 
along with other miscellaneous items to the extent all of those 
items exceed $1,200.  If that union member pays $400 in union 
dues, but incurs no other miscellaneous itemized deduction, he 
will not be able to deduct the amount.  Even if the union member 
gets past this hurdle in part, the standard deduction is likely 
 
29 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). However, dues used for lobbying or political campaign 
activity are not deductible under § 162(e). 
30 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012). 
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greater than the union member’s total itemized deductions, 
meaning, again, that the union member will not be able to deduct 
this business expense. 
The comparison to the businessman’s trade union dues is 
important.  As a business expense, those dues are deductible 
immediately from gross income above the line.  There is no 
itemizing for the businessman.  His income in most instances 
reduces his gross income. 
It is quite possible that because union members generally 
cannot deduct their union dues, labor interests are collectively 
overtaxed rather than undertaxed.  I will return to this point in 
Part VI when I analyze the case for how to tax labor interests. 
II. DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF GROUPS THEREIN 
Most normative income tax scholarship focuses upon either 
an economic efficiency or economic fairness dimension to model 
an ideal system or to critique the current one.  It asks whether a 
tax system is the most economically efficient or the most 
economically fair to different groups and classes of people.  
Nevertheless, in this Article I primarily critique our tax system 
on the dimensions of democracy and political voice equality.  On 
economic fairness, many utilize an entitlement or welfarist model 
to assess policy.31  On economic efficiency, scholars often use the 
Pareto—or Kaldor-Hicks—efficiency of a competitive market as a 
model to assess policy.32  We lack a model to assess political 
fairness in a democratic system.33  This Part, thus, begins to 
sketch a model of an ideal democratic system so that we can 
better assess current policy. I return again to this modeling in 
Parts III.D and Part VI. 
 
 
31 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987). 
32 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 62 
(1996). 
33 See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: 
Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 80 (2011) (discussing the 
lack of a baseline to assess a neutral political system); David Lowery et. al., Images 
of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y. 1212, 1212–13 (2015) 
(discussing that individual participation can be modeled on one-person one-vote, but 
that a pluralist group system lacks any coherent baseline upon which to judge 
whether it is unbiased). 
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Many elements of our tax system directly impact our 
democracy.  The choice to adopt a progressive tax, the choice to 
impose an estate tax, the choice to apply a corporate tax, and the 
choice to exempt some organizations from that tax all impact our 
democratic system by impacting the political voice of various 
citizens and entities.  Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the tax 
system’s impact on our democracy, even in one small part of the 
system, in order to evaluate the income tax impact on democracy 
more broadly. 
Should political voice equality be the sole or primary driver 
of income tax policy?  No.  Imposing confiscatory taxes to try to 
ensure perfect political voice equality is likely both problematic 
from an efficiency standpoint and American norms of fairness.  
While striving towards democracy is critical to a fair society, 
there are other important factors critical to assessing a tax 
system, including its economic fairness and efficiency.  The 
democracy-enhancing nature of a policy is only one factor in 
analyzing a tax system.  In the case of tax exemption and 
interest group dues, though, it is a particularly important factor, 
and maybe even the defining factor. 
This first part sketches the necessary conditions of 
democracy, discusses why democracy, and focuses closely on the 
element of political equality.34  A model of an ideal democracy 
allows us to critique its current form in the United States and to 
assess whether our choices of taxation impact our democracy in a 
positive or negative way.  Finally, it examines the role groups 
play within that system.  Some might question the need to detail 
why democracy.  However, many have different conceptions of 
what democracy might mean, and this effort will help clarify the 
terms of democracy.  Additionally, some do not really believe in 
democracy after all.  The Founders themselves, for instance, were 
highly distrustful of unfettered democracy and designed a system 
to combat against a majority taking complete control.  Someone 
who does not believe democracy to be the right form of 
government may also not accept the conclusions of this Article. 
 
34 In sketching this account of democracy, I rely heavily upon the work of Robert 
Dahl. In particular, I rely upon: ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 
(1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998) [hereinafter ON DEMOCRACY]; 
ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2003); 
ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter ON POLITICAL 
EQUALITY]. 
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A. How and Why Democracy? 
The fundamental question in considering politics is how the 
group is going to decide what to do.  In other words, who gets to 
determine what is in the best interest of the group, the 
association, the state?  The simplest and most direct answer to 
this question is:  “Among adults no persons are so definitely 
better qualified than others to govern that they should be 
entrusted with complete and final authority over the government 
of the state.”35  To put it more positively, we can make the moral 
judgment that all people are of equal, intrinsic worth and, 
therefore, ought to have an equal say in deciding what the group 
is going to do.  Professor Robert Dahl refers to this as the 
principle of “intrinsic equality.”36  Once one accepts this moral 
judgment about individuals, there are a series of principles that 
lead to some form of democratic government.  Democracy is an 
imperfect system that is littered with contradictions; and yet, if 
one accepts the basic principal of intrinsic equality, democracy 
appears to be the best choice. 
What are the ideal requirements for a democracy?  A 
democracy must allow all individuals an opportunity to 
participate in discussing options before a decision is final.37  That 
opportunity must be equal and real.  All individuals in the 
democracy must have an equal vote in any final decision.38  All 
the members must have an equal and real opportunity to 
examine and understand both the policy being considered for a 
vote and all reasonable alternatives.39  That understanding 
should include an appreciation of the consequences of the 
decisions.  Similarly, all members must be involved in setting the 
agenda of the association.40  Finally, all competent individuals in 
the association, which generally means all adults, must have 
these rights.41  To the extent any of these requirements are 
missing, political equality will be lacking.42 
 
35 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 34, at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 37. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 38. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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To highlight what this means it is useful to consider the two 
primary alternatives to democracy—anarchism and 
guardianship.43  A theorist who falls into either of these camps is 
much less likely to be persuaded by the arguments in this 
Article, because the argument depends largely on an acceptance 
of the principles of democracy.  They may still support the case in 
part because many of the principles are similar. 
In a highly simplistic sense, an anarchist wants to maximize 
human freedom and believes that a state is the primary inhibitor 
of human freedom.44  The fundamental principle of anarchism is 
that state coercion is evil.45  Thus, even if a state employs a 
democratic process to make rules and to enforce those rules, the 
anarchist will find that state illegitimate because it also uses 
coercion.  The anarchist believes the state should be run by 
voluntary organizations instead of through a democratic 
process.46  Thus, an association or state following anarchist 
principles that wants to follow some form of democracy needs 
complete unanimity to take action. 
The anarchist criticizes democracy by pointing to the harm of 
minority coercion.  This is a problem for the democratic theorist 
because he likewise does not believe it right for someone else to 
make choices for another.  Like the anarchist, he believes that 
coercion is wrong.  Thus, the anarchist critique puts the 
democratic theorist in a bind.  In a democracy, the majority 
makes the choice for a demos and thereby coerces a minority.47  
The anarchist critique calls into question whether majority rule 
is just.   
How does democracy withstand this critique?  The answer is 
twofold.  First, the democratic theorist notes that anarchy is 
impractical and maybe impossible.  Second, he accepts that the  
 
 
43 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37. 
44 Id. Anarchism is a very loosely held together system of thought. For a decent 
discussion of it as both a theory and a movement, see APRIL CARTER, THE POLITICAL 
THEORY OF ANARCHISM (1971), http://www.ditext.com/carter/anarchism.html (in 
particular, see Chapter 2, Anarchism and the State). 
45 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37. 
46 An anarchist would presumably fully support tax exemption for any nonprofit 
organization and would likely try to get as many aspects of our economy into that 
sector as possible, in order to erase as much of the state as possible. A libertarian 
would likewise be highly supportive of robust tax exemption for nonprofits. In both 
instances, though, they would expect those entities to be completely voluntary. 
47 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37. 
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coercion of the minority is problematic but argues that the 
democratic system, among governmental systems, results in the 
least amount of coercion. 
There are significant problems to the practicality of the 
anarchist case.  A key belief of the anarchist is that humans can 
successfully work together solely through voluntary 
organizations.  They believe it is possible to operate a complex 
society with absolutely no coercion.  However, there are no 
credible examples of such a government succeeding.48  
Additionally, there are two theoretical problems with the 
anarchist solution.  First, anarchists must believe that without a 
state there would be no coercion.49  If they are right, then they 
have a good case; but, based on almost all written history, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that coercion is ubiquitous among 
humanity.  In a society without a state, the strong will almost 
certainly take advantage of the weak.  If it can be shown that you 
are likely to have less coercion via a democratic state, then the 
anarchist argument under a utilitarian analysis should fail even 
under anarchist theory.  Second, most anarchist approaches 
depend upon some form of coercion to overthrow the original 
state.50  Thus, even anarchists accept the coercion of others to get 
to a better moral situation. 
The democratic theorist uses the anarchist’s acceptance of 
coercion to support democracy.  If coercion is acceptable to get to 
a better state, presumably coercion might be just if it could be 
shown that this particular coercion allowed a state to maintain 
the least amount of coercion.  The democratic theorist argues we 
achieve the least amount of coercion in a state where a majority 
controls the decisions of the state, and we also maximize the 
social choice function.51  Perhaps the most potent critique though 
remains that unless an anarchist’s utopian vision of a society 
without coercion can exist, the anarchist vision is simply 
unworkable. 
 
 
 
 
48 Id. at 46. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 45. 
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Guardianship, unlike anarchism, is a practical alternative to 
democracy.  Plato most famously proposed this form of 
government in The Republic.52  There he argued that we should 
establish a society that trains a class of people who are 
exceptional individuals in that they are both wise at governing 
and able to put the interests of the public ahead of their own 
interests.  B.F. Skinner also, in a more modern sense, made a 
case for governance by psychologists.53  A guardianship theorist 
holds two primary beliefs: (1) most people are incapable of 
governing, and (2) society can locate and train a small group of 
highly governance-capable people.54  Guardianship thrives 
because many instinctively believe there is some class of people 
that is qualified to govern, and conversely, that most people are 
not capable of governing. 
The guardianship theorist finds no problem supporting the 
first proposition.  Any review of the voting records of citizens, 
their competence regarding basic civic facts, and their lack of an 
ability to think of more than their own self-interests makes a 
pretty powerful statement regarding the supposedly limited 
ability of most people to govern.55  It is the second proposition 
that is problematic.  Proponents of guardianship must be able to 
also make the case that there are individuals who we can identify 
and properly train to wisely rule.  The proponent argues that 
because we already pick individuals to perform highly complex 
tasks there is no reason we cannot do the same for the task of 
governing.56  For instance, we identify and train physicians to 
perform tasks that are very difficult and subject to matters of life 
and death.  There is no reason to believe we could not do the 
same for our rulers argues the guardianship theorist.57  However, 
to make the positive case, we must be able to find this small 
 
52 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (n.d.). 
53 See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (2007). 
54 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 59. 
55 See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY 
DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2008) (making the case that most Americans 
are so ignorant of economic policy that they are not capable of governing on matters 
of economics); cf. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 13 (2012) (arguing that although the 
governing capabilities of most Americans are very low, they have enough capacity to 
govern themselves). 
56 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 62. 
57 Id. at 62–63. 
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minority of individuals with the moral, instrumental, and 
practical knowledge to govern, and these special people must be 
able to genuinely put the public ahead of themselves.  This seems 
highly implausible. 
If we reject guardianship as impractical or impossible, can 
we justify the principle of intrinsic equality?  It is the building 
block of the democratic idea.  It justifies the ability for us to 
accept that all adults in the group are capable of governance.  
The formation of the United States as a democracy of course 
relied upon this principle in the Declaration of Independence.  
But as suggested above by those who advocate guardianship, it is 
by no means self-evident that all people are created equal.  We 
all differ in ability both intellectually and physically.  These 
differences might allow someone to reasonably conclude that 
there are individuals who should govern because they have 
particularly strong capabilities in that regard. 
Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to accept the 
intrinsic equality principle.  First, almost all religious traditions 
and ethical traditions operate on this principle.58  Second, as 
explored in part when considering guardianship, all other 
principles are weaker.59  Those who are in the glorified category 
of superior are almost certainly convinced they are correct, but 
the others who are not considered superior are likely to disagree.  
Third, the principle is supported by prudence.60  It is the 
principle that best ensures we are treated as fair as possible.  
Finally, although perhaps guilty of circular reasoning, the 
principle is likely to be acceptable to more people than any 
other.61  Again, the principle maximizes the social choice 
function. 
The principle of intrinsic equality leads to a conclusion that 
political equality or political voice equality are necessary to any 
just political system.  Dahl labels this value “inclusion.”62  
Political voice equality means everyone in the group must have 
the opportunity to discuss potential policies, set the agenda, and 
vote on final decisions.  John Stuart Mill spoke clearly on this 
 
58 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 66. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 291 (expanded ed. 2005). 
59 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 66. 
60 Id. at 67. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 76. 
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point within a representative governmental context when he 
chastised the British government for failing to include the 
workingman in the decision making.  Mill said:  
[D]oes Parliament, or almost any of the other members 
composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the 
eye of the working man? When a subject arises in which the 
laborers as such have an interest, is it regarded from any point 
of view but that of employers of labor?63 
This critique still has powerful resonance today as we will see 
when we review what the political voice of labor looks like today 
in the United States. 
Beyond the principle of intrinsic equality, the other 
fundamental matter to democracy is the decision-making process.  
A democracy operates based on majority rule to maximize 
possible political equality in final decisions.  In a utilitarian 
sense, the procedural rule of decision making based on majority 
rule should insure that the greatest number of people get their 
way on a particular policy.  The rule should maximize the 
amount of freedom of the individuals of an association or state to 
govern themselves.  However, the challenge is what to do if the 
majority adopts a rule that hinders some of the identified 
necessary elements of a democracy. 
Once a final decision is made by majority rule, there will be 
some who did not get their choice.  This is fine in most cases.  
But, if the majority eliminates a fundamental right—or rights—
of the citizens of a democracy, then we no longer have a 
democracy.  The typical solutions to this problem are that we 
develop a populace that respects the norms of democracy, or we 
establish an undemocratic means of enforcing fundamental 
rights—a Supreme Court, for example.64  This particular 
connundrum is not for this Article to solve. However, the other 
challenging but integrally related question is considered in the 
next Section.  How should we operationalize the ideal democratic 
principles into a modern, large state?  This, after all, is what we 
have in the United States and is the more relevant issue for 
considering the place of a labor union in our democracy. 
 
 
63 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 67 
(New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers 1869). 
64 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 155, 173. 
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B. Application of Ideal Democracy to the Large Modern State—
the Problem with Groups 
Ideal democratic theory is utopian in nature.  Once a group 
is too large, it is impractical to achieve ideal democratic 
conditions.  Providing ten people a real opportunity to speak, 
consider, and decide is a much different proposition than 
providing such rights to one thousand people, much less one 
millon people.  In a large state, political voice equality simply 
becomes impossible.  Many factors lead to this problem:  
(1) differing abilities and resources; (2) scarcity of time for 
individuals; (3) numerosity; (4) the fact that the market impacts 
so many decisions; (5) the existence of international systems that 
impact our democratic choices; and (6) the reality that crises will 
occur.65  These factors mean that certain individuals or 
organizations with greater skill, money, or time will have greater 
capacity to influence the agenda, the information, and the final 
decision of a large state.  It means that we will likely stray far 
from the ideals of democracy we have already identified.  We will 
lack political voice equality among citizens. 
Nevertheless, ideal democratic theory provides a model for 
large democratic states to develop institutions that mimic the 
goals of the ideal democratic state.  To achieve something close to 
democracy in large, modern democratic states, or polyarchies66:  
(1) elect representatives of the people; (2) conduct elections 
regularly with fairness and without coercion; (3) guarantee 
freedom of speech, particularly on matters of criticizing the 
political system; (4) provide robust “[a]ccess to alternative 
sources of information” outside of the governmental regime; 
(5) allow associations, including political parties and interest 
groups, to form with ease; and (6) allow all adults to fully 
participate in all of the five freedoms listed above.67 
These institutions seem self-evident.  Because there is no 
way to operate a pure democracy in a polyarchy, electing 
representatives becomes the only functional way for the society 
to govern itself.  To obtain accountability of representatives, a 
polyarchy must adopt frequent elections.68  Perhaps, most 
critically, freedom of speech, information, and association become 
 
65 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 34, at 50–51. 
66 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 117. 
67 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 85–86. 
68 Id. at 95–96. 
FINAL_HACKNEY  12/18/2017  9:27 AM 
336 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:315   
the foundations of democracy.  These measures ensure that 
everyone has at least an opportunity to participate in 
information-gathering and agenda-setting.  While citizens will 
not generally get a say in final decisions made by their 
representatives, at least they are never shut out of the discussion 
if these institutions are maintained. 
However, do these five fundamental rights identified above 
ensure political voice equality necessary in ideal democratic 
theory?  No.  While implicitly found throughout those rights, 
none of those rights mandates a right to political equality.  
Because of the large size of the demos and the number and 
complexity of issues before the demos, most citizens will have no 
opportunity to participate in understanding the issues before the 
demos or in developing the information about alternative 
policies.  Critically, citizens who are not a representative get no 
vote on final decisions of the demos, and most citizens will have 
only limited opportunity to participate in the decision-making 
process.  Political voice equality in its ideal sense simply cannot 
exist in a polyarchy. 
Nevertheless, a natural solution might exist.  Groups of 
individuals with political interests might speak to political 
representatives on behalf of citizens to equalize citizen voice.  
The pluralists of the 1940s and 1950s argued that interest groups 
solved the problem of political voice equality.  In the pluralist 
view, interest groups form for every possible citizen interest and 
express the voice of those many interests to representatives.69  
Are they right? 
While the pluralists present a relatively positive vision of 
group activity in a democracy, there is a distinctly negative 
vision of interest groups in American thought.  Many say that the 
problem with the governance of the United States is that those 
interest groups are instead “special interests” that harm 
democratic equality.  In this vision, special interests control our 
representatives and thus our government for the benefit of some 
elite.  Interest groups cause harm to our democratic system 
 
69 See JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND 
REBELLION IN AN APPALACIAN VALLEY, 5–7 (1982) (discussing the one dimensional 
vision of power of the pluralists Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby suggesting that the 
American political system allowed anyone who wanted to express their voice to 
express it). Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: 
AUTONOMIES VS. CONTROL 207 (1982) (denying any pluralist actually ever held this 
facile of a notion of pluralist theory). 
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because they pursue selfish special interests rather than the 
common public interest.70  Professor Jeffery Berry says “there is a 
widespread popular perception that interest groups are a cancer 
spreading unchecked throughout the body politic.”71   
Group activity presents a challenge to a democracy.  Each 
group may represent a common interest as to its members, but 
the group will present a selfish interest as to the demos.  This 
group activity then destroys the ancient political goal of 
government seeking some common public good.  In a polyarchy, it 
is rare that we can find a common good.  This is the pluralist 
problem in a polyarchy.  The principles of democracy require 
even greater suffrage, and yet as those additional members come 
into the demos, the irreconcilable conflicts become ubiquitous.  
The democracy becomes a battle of groups for power rather than 
a collective of people searching for a path to the common good. 
In Federalist 10, James Madison warned of the dangers of 
factions, which he defined as groups of citizens organized to 
promote some common interest that is adverse to the rights of 
other citizens or the common good of the polity.72  Madison 
believed a minority faction was not to be feared because the 
majority could ensure through the simple power of numerosity 
that the minority could not control.73  He feared that a majority 
faction threatened the public good and the rights of citizens,74 
and therefore thought pure democracy was susceptible to 
tyrannical abuse by a majority.75  Madison recognized,76 in a 
 
70 JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 16 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
71 Id. 
72 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Yale Univ. Press ed., 2009). 
This point is important. Madison believed that there could be a single common will 
or public interest. Today, most doubt the idea that a singular public interest exists. 
In a polyarchy, there is a vast diversity of opinion as to the right direction for the 
polity to take. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159 (expanded 
ed. 2006) [hereinafter A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY]. 
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 72, at 50. 
74 Although Madison was involved in forming our democratic constitution, he 
seemed a proponent of guardianship. He genuinely believed there were some better 
suited to govern than others, and thought that a Republic was the best way to go 
about identifying those individuals. A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 
72, at 159. Madison was primarily concerned, as were many of his generation, and 
prior governmental theorists, with the masses taking away property rights. Id. at 
161. 
75 When making this claim, he likely thought of groups like Shays’ Rebellion. 
DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 4 (Knopf ed. 1951). 
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large country, some form of associational pluralism is necessary 
to governance.77  He believed that these factions could be 
controlled by forming a large republic with elected 
representatives of the people.78  He believed the large republic 
and representatives would work to disperse the power of a 
majority faction enough to protect the common public interest 
from the selfish faction.79 
Unlike the pluralists, Madison seems to have built his 
political theory on the assumption that a government should 
work to try to accomplish a singular common good.80  In the 
pluralist vision, there is no such thing as a common good for a 
demos.  The pluralist maintains that we should allow a diversity 
of groups to seek their interests through government.81  Rather 
than interest groups being the problem of polyarchy to solve, 
interest groups are the solution to the challenge of allowing all 
citizens’ voices to be heard.  The common good is found in the 
process of democracy, rather than in the results.  In other words, 
the focus is on a social choice function, rather than a social 
welfare function. 
Whether there is a common good or not, there are still real 
problems with the pluralist vision and solution.  Pluralist 
scholars Arthur Bentley and David Truman, in their early 
writings, seemed to suggest that any interest that wanted to 
form a group could in fact form that group.82  An interest is a 
collection of individuals that holds an interest in the 
governmental provision of some good, service, or policy.  Those 
citizens may hold that interest and never form a group.  Or, they 
may hold that interest and organize into a group.  That 
organization may be formalized legally, or it might stay relatively 
unorganized.  In the simple version of pluralism, all interests 
 
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 72, at 48 (“The latent causes of faction 
are thus sown in the nature of man.”). 
77 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 299; see also UNHEAVENLY 
CHORUS, supra note 1, at 270–71. 
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 72, at 51. 
79 Id. 
80 A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 72, at 160. 
81 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 295. 
82 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 276. See Taxing the Unheavenly 
Chorus, supra note 15, at 274–78 (discussing the pluralist vision); see also E. 
PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 22 (Johns 
Hopkins Press ed. 1929) (“Not only are almost all sorts of interests and classes 
represented but also all sides of most questions as well.”). 
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face the same challenge in formation.  Truman described interest 
formation and mobilization like waves.83  One group, like 
veterans, might organize to successfully seek pension benefits 
from the federal government.  Postal workers might see that and 
organize to generate similar benefits, and private employees 
might seek such benefits too.  Employers might then organize to 
offset these new benefits.  And so it goes.   
Since the early work on pluralism, many have identified 
significant problems with the theory.  E.E. Schattshneider 
criticized the pluralist vision stating that “[t]he flaw in the 
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong 
upper-class accent.”84  What he meant is that when we look at the 
groups that organize and operate in our democracy, we find that 
those groups overwhelmingly represent wealthy interests.  This 
is the collective action problem:  Some interests, such as the 
wealthy, are far more likely to organize and are far more likely to 
be heard than the unorganized.  This problem is discussed more 
below in Part III.  Additionally, there is no way to ensure 
equality of political voice when citizen voices come through 
different size and power groups.85  We will always come up short 
on democracy when we operate through groups rather than 
through all individual voices because groups do not equally 
represent all voices.  The problems with the group vision of 
democracy do not stop there.  Groups suffer from an agency 
problem.  Association leaders often speak for themselves rather 
than for the will of the members.  Finally, groups do not provide 
the only method through which policy is made.  Both elected 
representatives and individual citizens can have a real impact on 
our government agenda and decisions.86 
C. Thoughts on a Model Polyarchical Democracy 
The significant lack of clarity in what an ideal polyarchy 
might look like and the difficulty with using groups as a proxy for 
individual political voice makes it difficult to model a just 
 
83 TRUMAN, supra note 75, at 59. 
84 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960). 
85 See UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 271–75. 
86 See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest 
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 89–
90 (1986). 
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political system.  Building a model upon pure democracy would 
be the easiest.  The principle of one person, one political voice 
could be implemented by ensuring certain processes are always 
followed to respect every citizen’s right to participate in the 
polity’s decision making.  But such a basis may be too simple for 
a sophisticated model given the complexity of a polyarchy and the 
relationship of groups to a polyarchy.  Nevertheless, modeled off 
of the one person, one political voice principle, we might make 
some rough judgments that we could legitimately act upon. 
For one, it seems reasonable to assume that there should be 
some sense of balance in the interest group sector.  To the extent 
there is a lack of balance we might reasonably conclude that our 
democracy is coming up short on political voice equality.  This 
model will have significant flaws, but it seems a workable 
starting place to consider the difference in political voice equality 
among groups and among citizens.  If we are trying to maximize 
a social choice function, we should not implement a policy that 
exacerbate the political voice disparities between interests.  We 
might even try to enhance the political voice of some weaker 
groups. 
With this model in mind, the challenges presented by groups 
in a democracy and the collective action problem in the specific 
context of labor interests is considered in Part III.  What is the 
relative political voice capacity of labor as compared to business 
interests and other groups? 
III. LABOR UNIONS: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
REPRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Labor unions negotiate employment terms for all the 
employees of a bargaining unit, provide strike pay for union 
members on strike, and lobby and engage in politicking to obtain 
the best laws for its members.  Labor unions are fundamentally 
an interest group that provides a collective good and service to 
people who are employees.87  Labor union members tend to come 
from lower to middle income families.  Because of the collective 
action problem discussed below there are reasons to believe labor 
interests have a hard time organizing to advance their political 
voice.  The potential group of labor union members is large and 
the return from organizing to each potential union member is 
 
87 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 119 (1973). 
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likely far less than the costs of joining.  Furthermore, by law, to 
act on behalf of labor, a majority of employees in a bargaining 
unit must vote for a particular labor union.  This means that 
labor unions face a severe collective action problem.88 
“[M]ovements by the ‘powerless’ require strong and 
sustained outside support.”89  Hourly wage earners have long 
faced great challenges acting collectively.  Additionally, they 
have little role or say in the acts taken by their corporate 
employers.90  Businesses made up of a few organizations that 
possess money and skills tend to have a much easier time 
organizing and representing their interests before the 
government.91  Thus, we should expect our political balance to be 
skewed away from labor interests and towards business 
interests. 
This Part examines the collective action imbalance and finds 
the political voice of labor as compared to some other interests 
within our democracy to be particularly weak.  This Part also 
evaluates the composition of labor unions and finds that there is 
not significant diversity of voices among different labor interests 
or localities.  Certain regions and occupations are much more 
represented through this system.  Finally, it looks at evidence on 
whether unions represent a common will of their members.  It 
finds that there is evidence that the representation is biased to a 
certain extent towards managers.  This agency problem seems to 
be consistent across the interest group domain.  Thus, this Part 
finds problematically that even if labor is representing some 
labor voices, there are lots of labor voices that are left out of the 
political system. 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Id. 
89 J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker 
Movements (1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249, 251 (1977). 
90 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 
283 (1998). 
91 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 279. 
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A. Collective Action Problem and Labor Union Evidence 
The theory of collective action predicts that interests made 
up of a small number of individuals under circumstances where 
the return from the interest being fulfilled is high will be more 
likely to organize than those interests held by many where the 
return is small.92 
Citizens who have a shared interest in some good or service 
may desire to get their government to provide the good, service, 
or policy.  If we assume that this citizen is the rational, 
economically interested woman, when she looks at the question 
of whether to seek from the government the provision of that 
good, service, or policy she will make an economic calculation.  
Will the return from her effort be greater than the cost?  We can 
also refer to this sought good, service, or policy as a collective 
good.  By that I mean that once the good is provided, it will be 
provided to everyone.  Thus, there will be a couple of challenges.  
Generally, the return of these types of collective goods is going to 
be smaller than the costs.  Additionally, because the good is 
available to all, there is a free rider problem. 
Under Mancur Olson’s theory, industries populated by few 
players should be successful in organizing to seek collective goods 
from the government while individuals with shared interests who 
are vast in quantity, like manufacturing workers, should 
generally not be successful in such organizing.93  Similarly, we 
should expect to see differences in ability to organize based on 
human and capital resources.  Those interests associated with 
wealth and education are much more likely to organize than 
those associated with poverty and lack of education.  Evidence is 
strong that the basic contours of these predictions hold.94  Small 
wealthy groups form organizations with greater ease than large 
disperse organizations with small value to each individual 
member.  However, the theory is not perfect.  There is evidence 
that some citizen movements organize more often than Olson’s 
theory predicted.95 
 
 
92 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 57–59. 
93 Id. 
94 See UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 319–20. 
95 Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983). 
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Large groups seem to solve the collective action problem 
through three primary means: force of law, selective incentives, 
or purposive incentives.96  Trade associations and unions are both 
sometimes able to overcome the collective action problem by force 
of law.  For instance, a legislative body might pass a law forcing 
those interested in working in a particular profession to join a 
professional association, like a state bar, in order to work; in 
union parlance, this describes a “closed shop.”  “[S]elective 
incentives” refer to selling a good or service that the seller can 
exclude others from acquiring, such as magazines or insurance.97  
Finally, “purposive incentives” refer to incentives that provide no 
value other than the moral value a member obtains because he 
believes in the cause of the particular group.98 
In his book, Olson considered labor unions and set forth his 
theory of collection action.  He found evidence of the challenge of 
labor to organize in the history of the labor movement.  Early 
U.S. labor unions mostly consisted of local “small-scale 
production” operations, like building trades, shoemakers, and 
printers, rather than fields characterized as large manufacturing 
operations.99  Olson thought this state of affairs was a result of 
the fact that social benefits of the smaller unions were easier for 
members to see.  Nevertheless, over time there was a tendency 
for the small unions to connect on a national level.  Although 
unions start small, there is a natural tendency towards local 
unions organizing with a national union.  Locals join national 
organizations because the connection to a larger groups provides 
real insurance effects.  More importantly though, locals join a 
national organization for the simple fact that an employer finds 
it relatively easy to break a strike led only in one localized 
union.100 
As mentioned, one of the ways any interest can solve the 
collective action problem is to get a law passed mandating those 
interested in working in a particular job to join that organization.  
To Olson, the predominant means by which large unions 
overcame the collective action problem was by implementing 
closed shops.  There were some closed shops in early U.S. history, 
 
96 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 277, 282. 
97 Id. at 277. 
98 Id. at 282. 
99 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 66. 
100 Id. at 67–68. 
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including carters in the 1600s, shoemakers in the 1800s, and 
printers later in the 1800s.101  Problematically for unions, 
Congress banned the closed shop in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 
as described in Part IV below. 
Labor unions have also long offered various selective 
incentives, such as insurance-related benefits, to attract 
members.  This might include death, unemployment, disability, 
or old age benefits.102  Only large unions today tend to offer 
significant benefits such as education, scholarships, and medical 
care.103  The growth of government-provided benefits, such as 
social security and unemployment insurance, have likely cut 
significantly into the selective incentives a union can offer. 
Finally, labor unions use “purposive incentives.”  In the case 
of industrial, low-skilled, diverse workforces, it is thought that 
the only purposive incentive that is effective pre-union shop in 
organizing is “to be aroused by emotionally charged and 
comprehensive appeals to their lot as a dispossessed class.”104  
The Industrial Workers of the World represented many such 
individuals in pre-union shop situations, and its many efforts led 
to intense and often violent strikes.105  These purposive 
incentives almost certainly continue to play a role in union 
development and maintenance in the United States today.  This 
aspect of union organizing leads to one of the negative features of 
unions:  They tend to come with violence both from laborers and 
employers.106  Of course, to obtain any legal protections at all, a 
union first must overcome the collective action challenge. 
How does labor’s political voice compare with other types of 
interest groups in the interest group sector today?  In an analysis 
of the whole of the interest group sector at the Washington D.C. 
federal government level in 2001, labor unions made up only one 
percent of the interest group sector.107  Comparatively, business 
interests towered over labor interests:  Corporations made up 
34.9%, trade and other business associations 13.2%, and 
 
101 Id. at 69. 
102 WILSON, supra note 87, at 124. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 128. 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 68–83 
(1964) (discussing a particularly violent period of U.S. labor history). 
107 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl.11.3. 
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occupational associations 6.8%.108  While there are many other 
types of interests in our government that diverge from capital 
versus labor, this suggests at least that something is out of 
balance in this representational system.  A review of the interest 
group environment at the state level demonstrates this severe 
imbalance as well.109 
What if we look at political representation as compared to 
employment status?  In 2001, the U.S. workforce comprised 64% 
of the population.110  Different roles were filled in the following 
ways: executives 9.6%, professionals 10.2%, white collar workers 
18.4%, blue collar workers 24%, farm workers 1.5%, unemployed 
3.2%, and not in workforce 33.1%.111  How were each of these 
interests represented in the interest group sector?  Executives 
73.9%, professionals 17.3%, white collar workers 3.4%, blue collar 
workers 1.1%, farm workers 1.7%, unemployed 1.2%, and not in 
the workforce 1.4%.112  Again, the degree of inequality in 
representation of organized interests compared to labor is 
intense. 
For labor, the story looks worse when viewed over time.  The 
decline over time of union political voice is significant.  Labor 
unions saw its representation in the interest group sector shrink 
between 1981 and 2006.113  Meanwhile, the political interest with 
the least amount of increase increased in number by 32%, and 
the greatest sector increase was 883%, represented by health 
interests.114  Labor unions thus shrunk from an already low 1.6% 
of the interest group sector to just 0.8% of that sector.115  More 
worrisome yet for labor as a matter of political voice is the 
striking decline in labor union members in the workforce 
described below in Section B. 
Union testimony before Congress and electoral success is 
also on the decline.  The number of opportunities union staff has 
to testify in front of Congress is highly correlated with union 
 
108 Id. 
109 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or 
the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 1, 21 tbl.2 (1995) [hereinafter Population Ecology]. 
110 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 329 fig.11.1. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 353 tbl.12.1. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 356 tbl.12.2. 
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density.116  Union congressional testimony has dropped 
consistently with membership declines.117  Likewise, scholars 
estimate that membership is the biggest determinant of electoral 
success for a union.118  Others show that a greater number of 
members means more voters and more opportunities for financial 
contributions.119  In a seminal lobbying study looking at the 
trajectory of 139 issues over the years 1999 to 2002, the authors 
described highly limited union representation before Congress.120  
They found that labor reresentation is quite shallow as compared 
with other interests.121 
Studies show that corporations, business associations, and 
professional associations outspend labor unions in lobbying.  
Labor averaged under $500,000 lobbying per union, while the 
other three averaged all over $1,000,000.122  Additionally, while 
corporations and business associations are very likely to have 
highly connected lobbyists, labor unions seldom have such 
officials represent their interests.123  Finally, while labor unions 
have a higher average in political activity committee spending, 
there are so many fewer of these unions that labor as a broad 
interest is well outspent in this arena too.124 
One other line of study that is disconcerting for labor unions 
is that interests trying to overcome the collective action challenge 
may face a crowding out problem.125  Virginia Gray and David 
Lowery suggest that there is an ecosystem of interest groups that 
is determinative of the size and scope of that interest group 
 
116 Kyle W. Albert, An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. 
Congressional Hearings, 28 SOC. F. 574, 587 (2013). 
117 Id. at 586–87. 
118 DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
153–55 (1970). 
119 Marick F. Masters & John Thomas Delaney, Union Political Activities: A 
Review of the Empirical Literature, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 336, 344 (1987). 
120 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, 
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 9–10 (2009) [hereinafter LOBBYING AND POLICY]. 
121 Id. at 10. 
122 Id. at 200. However, Baumgartner and co-authors do not find a strong 
connection between policy outcomes and resources. Id. at 203. Business seems to win 
slightly more often, but not at a significant rate that would suggest their lobbying 
expenditures caused the policy wins. Id. They do not argue this means money spent 
on lobbying does not matter to policy outcomes. Instead, they believe that policy 
wins of business and wealthy interests happened long ago and those advantages are 
now simply a part of our political system. Id. at 212–14. 
123 Id. at 200. 
124 See id. 
125 JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 60 (1999). 
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sector.126  Under population ecology theory, the number of a 
certain entity type is dependent upon things that allow the entity 
type to exist.  Gray and Lowery state that “interest-group density 
is set at an equilibrium level by the environment.”127  They find a 
positive relationship between interest group size and population, 
constituent interest in goods and services, the certainty of those 
interests, the age of the interest system, and the size of the 
government.128  In the end, there are only so many organizations 
a certain population can support.  Once it has filled its capacity, 
whether with environmental, business, and health organizations, 
or charities, trade associations, and social welfare organizations, 
the group system can run out of capacity to support more 
organizations.  Thus, if a policy works to enhance one interest, 
that policy is simultaneously likely crowding out another group 
in the process. 
There is a caveat to the collective action research project.  
The work must be understood in light of a problem present in all 
of these studies129:  It is impossible to know what an unbiased 
interest group sector would look like.130  The Schattschneider 
vision of bias in the heavenly chorus is based on a baseline 
interest group sector that is isomorphic with society.  As 
Schlozman suggests, a reasonable baseline for comparing 
organizational representation of interests is the one person, one 
vote standard.131  But, there is no reason to believe that groups 
would ever perfectly align in this manner.  Because it is costly to 
organize, many interests will never organize.  Also some factors, 
such as loss are far more powerful than other factors, such as 
gain, in fomenting organization.132  Thus the dynamics of need for 
organizational involvement should necessarily ebb and flow over 
time, such that it should never be expected that organizations 
exactly mirror individual interests.133 
 
126 Population Ecology, supra note 109, at 1. 
127 Id. at 9. 
128 Id. at 12. 
129 David Lowery et al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 1212, 1221–25 (2015). 
130 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in 
Society and Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bias in the Heavenly Chorus]. 
131 Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political 
Equality and the American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1008–09 (1984). 
132 Bias in the Heavenly Chorus, supra note 130, at 10–11. 
133 Id. at 13. 
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B. What Do Unions Look Like Today? 
Unionization makes a difference to the bottom line of 
workers.  Union workers earn a premium, as compared to non-
union workers.  Non-union workers earned seventy-nine percent 
of the weekly median salary of a union worker.134  But, unions 
are quickly shrinking and we do not find unionization equally 
across regions or job type. 
In 2015, 14.8 million workers belonged to a union in the 
United States.135  This made up 11.1% of the workforce.  This is a 
significant decline from 1983, when 17.7 million workers 
belonged to a union, making up 20.1% of the workforce.136  And, 
in 1954, 39% of the private sector workforce was unionized.137  
Public sector unions far outpace their private sector counterparts 
today.  In 2015, over 35% of public sector workers were 
unionized, compared with only 6.7% of private workers.138  In 
fact, at the local government level, 41.3% of the workforce is 
unionized.139  The protective service industries—police officers, 
firefighters, education, and libraries—make up the largest sector 
of unions today.140  Union membership rates are highly state-
dependent, with New York exhibiting the highest rate of 
unionization at 24.7% and South Carolina the lowest rate at 
2.1%.141 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) tracks data regarding 
labor unions and other tax-exempt organizations, like business 
leagues exempt under Section 501(c)(6).  While this data is not 
perfect because it only captures those organizations filing 
applications and annual tax returns with the IRS and it depends 
on the self-reporting of the entities, it does paint a relative 
picture to consider.  In that data, one can see a similar reduction 
in labor unions particularly as compared to business leagues.  In 
looking at the rate of formation, it appears that for every one 
labor union that forms, more than three business leagues have 
 
134 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union 
Members—2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor 
Movement? Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97 (1999). 
138 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 134, at tbl.3. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at tbl.5. 
MPP_HACKNEY 12/18/2017  9:27 AM 
2017] PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? 349 
formed from 2005 to 2016.142  Additionally, the total number of 
unions registered with the IRS has continually shrunk from 
around 72,000 in 1990 to just under 47,000 in 2016.143  Business 
leagues, on the other hand, increased in number from 1990 at 
66,000 through 2010 at 92,000, then declined through 2016 at 
64,000.144  Total assets and revenue recorded with the IRS in 
Form 990 filings in comparison show a little cleaner picture.  
While labor held about 70% of the assets held by business 
leagues in 1990, it held only 54% in 2000, and then 46% in 
2013.145  Total assets for labor unions rose from a little more than 
$13 billion in 1990 to almost $37 billion in 2013.  Assets just rose 
more for business leagues from $19 billion to $80 billion over the 
same period.  Revenue of labor unions went from 67% of business 
league revenue to only 51% of business league revenue from 1990 
to 2013. 
Union demographics have changed significantly over the 
past 70 years.  A study of the changing demographic trends in 
labor from 1952 to 1999 shows a change of unionized non-
agricultural workforce percentage from 33.2% in 1955 to 13.9% in 
1999.146  In 2016, it was 10.7%.  Although in the 1950s and 1960s 
the union workforce was over 80% blue-collar, by 1998, white-
collar workers were the majority, making up 55% of the 
unionized workforce.147  Although in 1952 almost 90% of union 
members were male, in 1998, over 40% of union members were 
female.148  That number kept increasing.  By 2016, women made 
 
142 IRS Data Books maintain that information from 2005 to 2016 on Table 24a. 
See https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book. The rate is the author’s 
own calculation. 
143 IRS Data Book 1990, tbl.25, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/90dbfullar.pdf; 
IRS Data Book 2016, tbl.25, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. As a result 
of Congress passing a law in 2006 that forced small tax-exempt organizations to file 
limited information with the IRS or lose their tax exempt status, the entire tax-
exempt sector began declining in 2010. However, the rate of labor decline was almost 
continuous from 1990 to 2016.  
144 As a result of Congress passing a law in 2006 in the Pension Protection Act 
that forced small tax-exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS 
or lose their tax-exempt status, the entire tax-exempt sector began declining in 2010. 
This makes the data a bit messier than it would otherwise appear. 
145 SOI Tax Stats - Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exempt-
organizations-statistics (last updated Aug. 29, 2017). 
146 HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL 
ARENA 26 (2001) [hereinafter AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS]. 
147 Id. at 28–29. 
148 Id. at 30. 
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up 46% of union members.149  Although in the 1950s almost no 
union members had any college experience, much less a college 
degree, in 1996, 25% of union members had some college or were 
college graduates.150  By 2008, 37.5% of union workers held a 
college degree or greater.151  Although in 1952 90% of union 
members were white, in 1998, only 80% were white.152  The 
largest non-white group of union members in 1998 was 
comprised of Hispanics.153  In 1999, black men had a higher rate 
of unionization at 17.2% than whites at 13.5%, or Hispanics at 
11.9%.154 
Today, public sector unions are the dominant unionized 
employee sector.  Teachers’ unions, such as the National 
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, 
make up a large part of that public union force.155  The American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has also 
demonstrated significant growth, from 250,000 in the mid-
1960s156 to 1.6 million by 2016.157  President Kennedy spurred the 
growth of federal unions in 1963 when he signed Executive Order 
10,988, which allowed public employees to engage in collective 
bargaining.  Public sector unions also vote at a much greater rate 
than other sectors in favor of union certification.158 
Although the legal environment in different states and 
changes in different occupations impact this unequal 
relationship,159 there are likely other forces at work leading to 
different unions being succeeding in certain businesses.  For one, 
it tends to be easiest to form unions where the employees sought 
bear significant likeness in position, skill-level, location, religion, 
 
149 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 134. 
150 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 33. That percentage is 
apparently the same as the general population. 
151 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY 
RESEARCH, THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOR 1983–2008, at 1 (2009), 
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/changing-face-of-labor-2009-11.pdf. 
152 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 35. 
153 Id. at 35–36. 
154 Id. at 37. 
155 PETER L. FRANCIA, THE FUTURE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 55 (2006). 
156 Id. 
157 About AFSCME, AM. FED’N OF STATE, CTY., AND MUN. EMPLOYEES, 
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
158 FRANCIA, supra note 155, at 56. 
159 Clawson & Clawson, supra note 137, at 97–101. 
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or ethnicity.160  Associations that are formed around one 
occupation are more likely to form and survive than those of 
more diverse interests.161  Once one brings in a diverse 
population, the collective action problem becomes much more 
severe.  In some countries, for instance, the union shop 
agreement is not the norm at all, but the exception.  There, 
however, it appears that in many instances unions are held 
together via some other unionizing force such as religion—
Catholic or anti-Catholic—or ideology—Marxist, socialist.162 
C. Do Labor Unions Represent the Common Will of 
Membership? 
In an article focused heavily on democracy, it is important to 
discuss whether a union represents the interests of its members.  
This raises the question again of whether it is possible to 
generate some common good of a group.  Whether unions 
represent the common interest of members or not should at least 
implicate whether we think of them as advancing the cause of 
democracy. 
Not unlike the findings that our democracy is skewed 
towards wealthier interests,163 within interest groups themselves, 
large patrons tend to sway the view expressed of many nonprofit 
institutions.164  The wealthiest interests of business associations 
tend to be the dominate influence over the interests for which 
these groups decide to advocate.165  I have not found evidence 
demonstrating that labor unions suffer from this problem.  This 
 
160 WILSON, supra note 87, at 123; John Paul Ferguson, Racial Diversity and 
Union Organizing in the United States, 1999–2008, 69 I.L.R. REV. 53, 55 (2016) 
(“[W]ork groups that win union representation are less racially diverse than the 
population of work groups that initially filed the election petitions.”). Many have 
taken this basic fact to find that unions are antithetical to civil rights. However, 
there is good social science evidence that unions can and have provided important 
wins that foster civil rights, rather than hinder it. Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, 
“So Closely Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135, 
1183–84 (2013). 
161 WILSON, supra note 87, at 123; Shaun Bevan, Continuing the Collective 
Action Dilemma: The Survival of Voluntary Associations in the United States, 66 
POL. RES. Q. 545, 548, 553 (2012); see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF 
ENTERPRISE 22–23 (1996). 
162 WILSON, supra note 87, at 121. 
163 GILENS, supra note 55, at 1. 
164 Walker, supra note 95, at 401–02. 
165 Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives 
Trade Association Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 213, 219 (2012). 
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may be because labor unions tend to be very dependent upon the 
union dues model; they may not be able to use a significantly 
increasing sliding scale fee schedule in the way that business 
associations tend to adopt.  Labor unions directly represent 
individuals rather than institutions. 
Does this mean that the leaders of unions are more likely to 
represent the individual median members?  While there are 
indications that unions, at times, adopt relatively democratic 
means of representation, the stronger evidence is that leaders 
tend to diverge from the majority interest of union members, at 
least in part.  Of course, it may be more accurate to state that the 
labor union members, like many people, are focused more on 
their own economic situation than any outside politics. 
Although I describe labor unions as interest groups, most 
members do not join primarily for the interest group activities.  
They join because the union negotiates contracts with 
management and protects employees from unfair management 
actions.166  One study suggests job security is the number one 
motivating factor for joining a union.167  As Professor Moe states, 
union members “stress economic benefits, they place high value 
on selective incentives, their membership is not contingent upon 
political considerations, and their individual contributions have 
little political impact.”168  This simple fact sets up an agency 
problem when union leaders represent union members before 
government.  The interests of union leaders may not align with 
union members, and members may not pay close attention to this 
fact.  Remember, though, this is not unique to labor unions.  
Business association leaders also diverge in representation of 
members, although they diverge toward the wealthier interests. 
Leaders of unions tend to diverge in beliefs from their 
members.  Leaders tend to believe strongly in the union as part 
of the labor movement.169  In a study of members of Ohio unions, 
it was found that while a plurality of members stated they 
belonged to the Democratic Party, at the same time, the members 
believed approximately two-thirds of leadership identified with 
 
166  AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 47; see also TERRY M. MOE, 
THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF 
POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 172 (1980). 
167 MOE, supra note 166, at 173. 
168 Id. at 174–75. 
169 Id. at 175. 
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the Democratic Party.170  Anecdotal evidence supports this 
divergence as well.  A labor attorney, Thomas Geoghegan, 
reports one union member expressing:  “The guys who start out 
running for Union office?  Don’t trust them.  They’re out for 
themselves.”171  The union member suggests there are some good 
ones, but that most are motivated by self-interest. 
Many labor scholars discuss the question of whether unions 
themselves are democratic.  This issue relates directly to whether 
the union mirrors the will of those it represents.  In the 1950s, at 
the height of union power, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman published 
a seminal study on union democracy by examining the 
International Typographical Union—the only union at the time 
with a two-party system.172  Lipset and coauthors were impressed 
with ITU’s democracy.  However, they ultimately found it 
unlikely that democracy would prevail in most unions.173  They 
believed that large organizations simply did not permit the pure 
democracy envisioned by theorists.174  Despite this critical 
assessment of the possibility of democracy within unions, the 
authors still concluded that unions were important elements of 
maintaining some level of democracy in a polyarchy.175 
More modern studies have considered the same question and 
have found the Lipset determination too constraining on the 
definition of democracy and too pessimistic.176  They have found 
that many unions use some important democratic features to 
make their decisions.  Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that 
unions operate like the New England town democracy of Robert 
Dahl.177  As is to be expected, a small group of individuals tend to 
make the decisions of these organizations and that small group of 
leaders’ ideology likely differs in some part from a large portion 
of the union’s membership.  Nevertheless, labor union members 
 
170 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 47–64. 
171 THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?: TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR 
WHEN IT’S FLAT ON ITS BACK 183 (1991). 
172 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL 
POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 3 (1956). 
173 Id. at 403. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 413. 
176 Tom Langford, Union Democracy as a Foundation for a Participatory Society: 
A Theoretical Elaboration and Historical Example, 76 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 79, 82–
83 (2015). 
177 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN 
AN AMERICAN CITY (2d ed. 2005). 
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probably have more democratic rights than any other members of 
a nonprofit organization because of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act.178  That Act provides a Bill of 
Rights to union members ensuring them democratic procedures 
in the operation of the union. 
D. Implications for a Model To Judge Political Voice Equality 
I adopt the intrinsic equality principle as the basis of a 
model to assess current policy.  There is no one better than each 
individual to decide for herself how her life should be governed.  
While many in our society today think of one person, one vote as 
the defining principle of a modern representative democracy, the 
intrinsic equality principle demands more.179  A principle of one 
person, one political voice is more descriptive of that ideal model.  
As we assess our U.S. system, we should strive toward political 
voice equality.  The key here is, in assessing political fairness, we 
should be maximizing a social choice function rather than a 
social welfare function.  The question in political fairness is not 
whether a person realized a particular governance decision 
outcome, but whether her political voice was respected as a part 
of the political process.  This model means that in evaluating the 
question of labor union tax policy we should care more about 
whether labor union tax policy enhances political voice equality 
than whether it results in a better economic environment for 
society. 
Political voice equality in a small group would be relatively 
easy to assess.  We could use some process like Robert’s Rules of 
Order to ensure everyone in the group had her voice respected in 
decision making.  However, in a polyarchy the question of 
political voice equality becomes much more difficult to 
determine.180  In part, political voice equality is found in the 
exercise of the vote in free and fair elections to determine 
representatives who will discuss and determine final policy for 
our polity.  However, elections do not provide complete political 
voice opportunities.  Citizens depend largely upon interest groups 
to fulfill that function.181  Establishing an unbiased interest 
 
178 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–
531 (2012). 
179 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 36. 
180 See supra Part III.A. 
181 See discussion supra Introduction. 
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system is difficult because it is hard to determine the different 
types of distinct interests in existence, who a group is acting for, 
how effective any group might be at having its voice heard, how 
representative of a group an interest group might be, and how to 
determine what that interest system should look like over time. 
Nevertheless, we have many guideposts that can help us 
make a determination regarding political voice equality.  For 
instance, collective action theory provides a way of assessing 
which interests will face the most severe collective action 
challenges.  Additionally, extensive studies illustrate the ebb and 
flow of the interest group sector over time and we can compare 
that to the total population.  While these various theoretical and 
empirical strategies do not allow us to be precise in any way in 
policy choices, they do help to sketch out the broad outlines of a 
biased system.  That sketch should at least aid us in thinking 
about the public policy we adopt so that we can try to build a 
policy that does not exacerbate the bias of that system.  We 
might even, under certain circumstances, work to ameliorate that 
bias where the considered judgment of theory and empirical 
evidence is that the bias is stark. 
Thus, with labor unions, theory predicts labor interests will 
be underrepresented in our democratic system.  Theory also 
predicts many wealthy business interests will not suffer such 
collective action problems such that there will be a bias in the 
interest system of business as compared to labor.  The evidence 
suggests this bias is real, increasing, and stark.182  We could look 
deeper to see if in fact policy preferences indeed tilt away from 
the general interests of labor, but under the social choice function 
model adopted here, there is no need to further assess that 
matter.  Based on the fact that labor is broadly left out of the 
political discussion, particularly when compared with that of 
business, we could embark on policy choices to change that 
reality. 
 
 
182 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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IV. LABOR UNIONS: HISTORY AND TAX LAW 
A. Very Brief History 
Labor associations in a sense have been a part of the United 
States since its inception.  In examining this history, it is 
worthwhile to make a distinction between trade associations and 
trade unions.  A trade association, which I have referred to above 
as a business association or business league, is typically made up 
of independent businessmen who are trying to protect the price of 
the goods or services that they sell.183  Trade unions, which I have 
referred to here as labor unions, are made up of wage earners 
who organize to earn better wages and better working 
conditions.184  Trade unions began forming in in the late 1700s.185  
In 1792, a society of Philadelphia shoemakers in 1792 formed the 
first trade union in the United States;186 it did not last a year.  
The early unions were made up of trades such as cordwainers, 
printers, and tailors, and seemed to be associated with a growing 
ability to mass produce goods.187 
A major roadblock to forming trade unions at the time was 
that they were generally illegal under U.S. law.  For instance, 
New York cordwainers were convicted of conspiracy to raise 
wages and operating a closed shop.188  Journeymen tailors in 
Philadelphia were similarly convicted in 1827.189  In 1840, 
though, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that it was not 
illegal for laborers to so organize.  This was a legal turning point 
for labor.190 
The United States was largely made up of farmers at the 
time.191  In 1820, farmers comprised 71.8% of our workforce.192  
The growth of labor unions appears to be connected to 
industrialization in the North.  Between 1860 and 1870, factory 
 
183 TAFT, supra note 106, at 3. 
184 Id. 
185 Id.; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1 (rev. 
ed., Longmans, Green & Co., 1920). 
186 TAFT, supra note 106, at 5. 
187 Id. at 3–5. 
188 Id. at 10. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 11. 
191 RUSSELL O. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4 
(2003). 
192 Id. 
MPP_HACKNEY 12/18/2017  9:27 AM 
2017] PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? 357 
workers increased from 1.3 million to 2 million.193  For the first 
time, there were more factory workers than farmhands.194  At 
this point, there were a total of 5.5 million non-farm workers 
with a population of 35.2 million people in the country.195  The 
country’s first national labor union, called the National Labor 
Union, was organized in 1866.196  Still, until the formation of the 
American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) in 1886, national 
unionization efforts were neither cohesive nor effective.197  The 
signal success of the union organization effort of the AFL was 
that it was based on organizing groups of skilled individuals that 
had commonality and who were interested in protecting their 
particular wage.198 
Labor unions saw their greatest rise in the period between 
1897 and 1904.  During that time union membership increased 
from 477,000 to 2,072,000 members.199  This period also appears 
to be an apex of the fight for the closed shop.200  Business 
associations and the government reacted strongly to this effort 
and stemmed the tide starting in 1904 when Theodore Roosevelt 
and the National Association of Manufacturers led the effort 
against unions.201  Union membership rates then remained 
relatively stable between 1935 and 1945.202  Not insignificantly, 
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, making collective 
bargaining a policy of the United States.203  The United States 
Supreme Court found the Act constitutional in 1937; union 
membership increased by fifty-seven percent that year.204  The 
Act gave many protections to unions and included in its 
provisions the right to a closed shop. 
 
 
193 PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN 
AMERICA 71 (2010). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.at 75. 
197 TRUMAN, supra note 75, at 4, 68. 
198 Id. 
199 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 77. 
200 Id. at 78. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 79. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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In the 1950s, union membership achieved its greatest 
membership in relation to the workforce.205  However, as 
discussed above in Part III, union membership has had its most 
significant decline over the past thirty years.  Many forces have 
played a role in this decline, including structural changes in our 
economy, bad political instincts of labor union leaders, aggressive 
employers successfully utilizing anti-union tactics, and even a 
lessening of support among workers for unions.  Nevertheless, 
scholars have little agreement on the real cause.206  This trend 
does seem to be universal across nations, but the decline in the 
United States is particularly significant.207 
B. Tax Exempt Requirements for Labor Unions 
Congress exempted labor unions from tax first in the Tariff 
Act of 1909.208  In its initial drafting, the Senate Finance 
Committee did not include the phrase “labor organization.”209  
After labor unions complained, however, Congress added the 
phrase “labor organization” to the statute.210  It appears that 
labor unions complained in part because they were worried that 
the taxation of insurance companies would ensure that labor 
unions that engaged in some insurance activities would be 
subject to tax under the Code.211  Congress maintained the 
exemption of labor unions in the 1913 Income Tax Act and 
additionally added the terms we know today of labor, 
agricultural, and horticultural organizations.212  I focus only on 
the labor portion of the statute.  Agricultural and horticultural 
organizations bear much more in common with trade associations 
exempt under Section 501(c)(6) of the Code.213 
To qualify under Section 501(c)(5), a labor union: (1) may not 
allow its earnings to inure to the benefit of its members, and (2) 
must “have as [its] objects the betterment of the conditions of 
those engaged in such pursuits, the improvement of the grade of 
 
205 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 87. 
206 Id. at 89. 
207 Id. at 91. 
208 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (exempting “labor organization[s]”). 
209 44 CONG. REC. 4148–49 (1909) (statement of Sen. Burkett). 
210 See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 4154 (1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4155 (1909). 
211 James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 
523, 530–31 (1976) (citing 44 CONG. REC. 4149, 4154, 4155 (1909)). 
212 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 172. 
213 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 353 n.148. 
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their products, and the development of a higher degree of 
efficiency in their respective occupations.”214  A labor union must 
serve individuals who are considered to be “labor.”215  Thus, for 
instance, an organization of “drivers, trainers, and horse owners, 
most of whom are independent contractors or entrepreneurs,” did 
“not qualify for exemption as a labor [union].”216 
Courts have interpreted the term “labor organization” 
liberally to ensure the protection of labor interests.217  In that 
vein, the IRS found an apprenticeship committee organized 
primarily to establish standards in skilled crafts, determine the 
qualifications necessary to become a journeyman, and aid in 
adjusting and settling disputes between the employer and the 
apprentice, qualified as a labor union.218 
Typical exempt activities of a labor union include collective 
bargaining,219 publishing labor newspapers,220 allocating work 
assignments among union members,221 and providing litigation 
support to controlling unions.222  A teacher’s association that 
“sponsors seminars and courses for its members, participates in 
teacher conventions, bargains collectively and processes 
grievances, and keeps its members informed of its activities 
through regular meetings and a newsletter,” qualifies as a labor 
union.223 
Under IRS guidance, a union can maintain a pension plan 
and qualify as a labor union.224  While IRS guidance prohibits a 
pension plan from qualifying as a labor union by itself, there is a 
 
214 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a) (1997). 
215 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153. 
216 Rev. Rul. 78-288, 1978-2 C.B. 179; see also Rev. Rul. 74-167, 1974-1 C.B. 134 
(“[I]nclusion of some self-employed persons in the membership of a qualified labor 
[union] does not affect the organization's exempt status.”). 
217 Portland Coop. Labor Temple Ass’n v. Comm’r, 39 B.T.A. 450 (1939). 
218 Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 C.B. 121. 
219 Rev. Rul. 77-154, 1977-1 C.B. 148 (Nurses’ association “whose primary 
activity is acting as a collective bargaining agent for its members qualifies . . . .”). 
220 Rev. Rul. 68-534, 1968-2 C.B. 217 (Labor union that publishes a newspaper 
providing information on union activity is performing an exempt function).  
221 Rev. Rul. 75-473, 1975-2 C.B. 213 (“[O]rganization, controlled and funded 
jointly by a labor union and an employer association, that operates a dispatch hall to 
allocate work assignments among union members and engages in other activities 
appropriate to a labor union qualifies . . . .”). 
222 Rev. Rul. 74-596, 1974-2 C.B. 167 (Organization that provides supporting 
litigation activities, proper for any one of its member unions, directed to the 
betterment of conditions for public employees qualifies). 
223 Rev. Rul. 76-31, 1976-1 C.B. 157. 
224 Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962-1 C.B. 87. 
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circuit split on the issue.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit recognized that a pension plan managed 
jointly by an employer and a union qualifies as an exempt labor 
union.225  The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, however, agreed with the IRS that a foreign pension fund 
similarly controlled by an employer and a union did not 
qualify.226  The court reasoned that the pension fund was neither 
controlled by nor represented traditional labor unions. 
A labor union may not operate a business as an exempt 
purpose even if the business is there to solely employ members 
and turn over all profits to the labor union.227  Similarly, an 
organization controlled by private individuals that offers strike 
insurance does not qualify under Section 501(c)(5).228  Providing 
ministerial services for labor unions, such as creating an 
organization holding employment taxes,229 or establishing 
savings accounts230 for union members, are not validly exempt 
labor union activities. 
The tax law does not impose significant restrictions or 
disclosure obligations on labor unions.  Labor law, however, 
places significant restrictions and disclosure obligations that 
treat labor unions worse in many ways than business 
associations.  Under tax law, labor unions may lobby before 
legislative bodies.231  Like social welfare organizations and 
business leagues, tax law does not require labor unions to 
publicly disclose its donors.232  However, the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act requires labor unions to disclose all 
 
225 Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560, 563–64 (2d Cir. 1993). 
226 Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en 
Maatschappelijke Belangen (PGGM) v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998); see also Tupper v. United States, 134 F.3d 
444, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a pension plan controlled by an employer 
and a union did not qualify for exemption as a labor union). 
227 Rev. Rul. 69-386, 1969-2 C.B. 123. 
228 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153; cf. Rev. Rul. 67-7, 1967-1 C.B. 137 
([O]rganization established by a labor union to provide strike and lockout benefits to 
its members is a labor union). 
229 Rev. Rul. 66-354, 1966-2 C.B. 207. 
230 Rev. Rul. 77-46, 1977-1 C.B. 147. 
231 Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328. 
232 A labor union must file a Form 990 and attach a schedule B, Schedule of 
Contributors. That schedule requires a labor union to disclose its substantial donors, 
who are typically those who donate more than $5,000. However, unlike the Form 
990, which is publicly disclosed, the IRS does not publicly disclose labor union 
schedule B. 
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sources of income in excess of $5,000.233  Under tax law, a labor 
union may intervene in a political campaign as long as it does not 
become a primary activity.234  Federal election law, though, 
prohibits a labor union from spending its treasury funds on such 
political campaigns.235  A labor union might owe a tax under 
section 527(f) for any expenditures it makes on political 
campaign activity.236  To avoid this tax and comply with federal 
election law, the union can set up a segregated fund that is 
effectively a Political Action Committee under Section 527.237 
Most unions must file a Form 990 disclosing information 
regarding its financial activities.238  The Form 990 is disclosed 
publicly.  Nevertheless, because labor unions must disclose so 
much to the Department of Labor, such as its donors, and to the 
Federal Election Commission, the Form 990 information is 
probably less important for the public than that form is for 
organizations like charities or even business associations. 
As discussed in Part I above, labor unions receive a subsidy 
from the exemption from tax because they are able to defer taxes 
to a later year.  While there is no charitable contribution 
deduction for union dues, dues are deductible under Section 162 
as a business expense.  Nevertheless, in many instances union 
members may not be able to deduct this expense.  A union 
member in most instances is restricted in deducting dues because 
dues are an itemized deduction and also a miscellaneous 
itemized deduction subject to the two percent floor.239 
V. RATIONALES FOR TAX EXEMPTION 
Few scholars have considered the rationale for labor union 
tax exemption.  One author suggests that the exemption of labor 
unions may have been built upon a principle of 
 
233 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2012). Extensive reports about the financial activities of 
labor unions are available on the Department of Labor website, at https://olms.dol-
esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
234 JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, IRS C.P.E., POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) 
ORGANIZATIONS L-1, L-2 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf; cf. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1 (1960) (fails to list intervening in a political campaign as a 
valid purpose of a labor organization). 
235 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (2015). 
236 26 U.S.C.A. § 527 (West 2014). 
237 REILLY & BRAIG ALLEN, supra note 234, at L-6. 
238 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033 (West 2014). 
239 Halperin, supra note 25, at 163; see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 307. 
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nondiscrimination.240  After choosing to exempt trade 
associations, Congress may have felt compelled to provide a 
similar exemption to labor as well.241  The general sense though 
is that exemption for labor unions is a divergence from normal 
tax law, such that to the extent there is income earned in the 
labor union that is not taxed, it is a subsidy to the union and its 
members. 
The earliest consideration of labor union tax exemption 
appears to be by Neale M. Albert and Sanford I. Hansell, who 
expressed concern about providing a subsidy to an entity that 
was becoming particularly powerful and might cause harm to the 
economy.242  They found that labor unions seemed to generally 
deserve exemption as a legal matter, at least under the system 
established by Congress.  However, they worried that the power 
of labor was beginning to threaten our system of free enterprise 
and skew the labor versus capital collective-bargaining 
arrangement.  Thus, they argued Congress should consider 
limiting the tax favorability of the labor union tax system.  
Although they thought taxing a union on union dues payments 
inequitable, they thought taxing either investment income 
broadly, or dividends more narrowly, could be supported.243 
Lawrence Stone also believed that labor unions should not be 
exempt from tax.244  Stone suggested that while we may not miss 
the right normative tax result by too much, it probably would be 
easier to handle some thorny issues of taxation of these 
organizations under a cooperative model instead.245  David Miller 
more recently agreed with this basic assessment, and argued we 
should tax labor unions just like we tax social clubs: tax 
investment income and nonmember income.246 
 
 
240 McGovern, supra note 120, at 531. 
241 Id. 
242 Neal M. Albert & Sanford I. Hansell, The Tax Status of the Modern Labor 
Union, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 137, 153 (1962). 
243 Id. at 160. 
244 Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt 
Organizations: The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. SO. CAL. TAX INST. 27 (1968). 
245 Id. at 58–60. 
246 David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their 
Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 452 (2014). 
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George Rahdert and Boris Bittker cursorily considered the 
rationale for labor unions.247  As a mutual benefit organization, 
established to support their members, they believed that any 
income earned by the organization should be allocated to the 
members and then taxed to them.248  They seemed little bothered 
by labor union tax exemption because almost all expenses of a 
labor union would be deductible to union members; the primary 
benefit of tax exemption would be a matter of deferral.249 
Halperin reviewed the exemption of mutual benefit 
organizations and found that in the context of business related 
nonprofits, tax exemption provided a deferral benefit that should 
probably be eliminated.250  He believed that elimination should 
extend to labor unions even though they presented a more 
sympathetic claim for exemption.251  He did not think the amount 
of money involved substantial because of the fact that almost all 
the money spent by a labor union would be a deductible amount. 
With the exception of Albert and Hansell, who recommended 
changing policy because of the negative societal effects they 
perceived coming from labor unions, the above approaches focus 
on whether labor unions should be taxed based on whether the 
activity generates taxable income or not.  A couple of economists 
have approached the rationale of tax exemption from an 
economic efficiency point of view.  These analyses generally 
assume that tax exemption provides a subsidy. 
Although neither has spoken directly on the issue of tax 
exemption for labor unions, their thought is instructive in 
thinking about the question.  Henry Hansmann argues that the 
nonprofit sector tends to provide goods and services that are 
undersupplied in our economy because of contract failure.252  
Burton Weisbrod argued that we should not only expect under-
investment in collective goods by the private sector, but that we 
should also expect underinvestment from the public sector, and 
government as well.253  For Weisbrod, the nonprofit sector 
provides goods and services where there is government failure.  
For both Hansmann and Weisbrod, tax exemption is one possible, 
 
247 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 354–55. 
248 Id. at 306. 
249 Id. at 354. 
250 Halperin, supra note 25, at 166. 
251 Id. at 163. 
252 Hansmann, supra note 13, at 67–69. 
253 See generally Weisbrod, supra note 14. 
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if flawed, way of remedying the undersupply of these identified 
goods.  Collective goods, sometimes called public goods, consist of 
those goods or services that once provided to one, cannot be 
excluded from any.254 
Hansmann focuses on market failure.  He argues that 
nonprofit firms are likely the most efficient provider of certain 
goods and services subject to significant contract failure.255  By 
contract failure, he means those goods or services whose 
provision does not happen at an optimal level because of some 
market failure, such as asymmetric information.  For instance, 
the provision of goods or services to poor people on behalf of 
donors is subject to substantial contract failure because the 
purchaser—the donor—cannot easily confirm that the goods or 
services are delivered to the poor person.  Thus, we should expect 
fewer donations to charitable organizations serving the poor than 
is optimal.  Nonprofit firms, he suggests, are the most efficient 
providers in such contract failure situations.256  Finally, the 
subsidy provided by tax exemption is well matched to nonprofit 
needs because nonprofits do not have access to equity markets 
and the tax subsidy helps ease that burden.257 
Hansmann does not claim that this rationale is a strong one, 
only a sufficient one.258  He believes that, on economic efficiency 
grounds, we should be slightly better off with the capital subsidy 
of tax exemption.259  Hansmann suggests that a useful method for 
assessing whether nonprofits make more sense within an 
industry is to observe whether there is a for-profit counterpart in 
that industry.  That there is a large for-profit contingent in the 
industry is evidence that the nonprofit firm may not be the most 
efficient provider of the service or good.  However, it is not 
conclusive evidence. 
While Hansmann does not apply his theory to labor unions, 
he does consider its application to mutual nonprofits generally.  
He argues that social clubs, such as country clubs, likely do not 
face capital formation challenges.260  Country clubs and other 
such organizations are easily able to attract the funds they need 
 
254 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 14–15. 
255 Hansmann, supra note 13, at 70. 
256 Id. at 74. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 75. 
259 Id. at 92. 
260 Id. at 94. 
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for their operations.  He also believes they do not really suffer 
from a contract failure.  It is not clear how Hansmann would 
apply his analysis to labor unions.  I will turn to this in my 
analysis towards the conclusion of the Article. 
Weisbrod developed a simplistic model of a society with a 
private for-profit sector and a public governmental sector.261  He 
assumes that in any society, for-profit firms will tend to provide a 
certain amount of private goods.  The government, in turn, will 
provide a certain amount of collective goods.262  Weisbrod 
assumes, though, that the government will never provide an 
optimal level of collective goods; it will only provide the level 
desired by the median voter.  Although private firms may provide 
some private goods that are collective good substitutes, they will 
never be sufficient.263  He argues that public subsidy of voluntary 
behavior can work to supply collective goods that meet the needs 
of the non-median voter.264  This theory is typically referred to as 
the government failure theory.  Weisbrod did not consider the 
impact of his theory on the question of labor unions. 
In a political justification, some, including justices of the 
United States Supreme Court, have argued that nonprofits foster 
pluralism.265  There is a strong traditional sense that the 
nonprofit sector is a place for experimentation and the generation 
and dissemination of ideas that are critical to a healthy 
democracy.  This American love of voluntary associations 
fulfilling this deeply democratic purpose was noticed by Alexis de  
 
261 Weisbrod, supra note 14, at 27. 
262 Id. at 23. 
263 Id.at 11. 
264 Id. at 30–32; see also John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1057, 1078 n.87 (2016) (discussing the nature of public goods, collective goods, and 
private goods, and the lack of a clear-cut definition between these items). 
265 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.4 (11th ed. 
2016); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, 
indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also LESTER M. 
SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); John W. 
Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii–xv (Brian 
O’Connell ed. 1983); Elizabeth T. Boris & Matthew Maronick, Civic Participation 
and Advocacy, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 394 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 
2d ed. 2012). 
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Tocqueville, who wrote with admiration of the American 
tendency to form associations to accomplish all sorts of objects 
that might typically have been left to the government.266 
There are scholars who generally support a vibrant 
voluntary nonprofit sector.  Theda Scokpol, for instance, believes 
that nonprofits of a voluntary membership nature serve an 
important democratic-enhancing role.267  Her work documents 
that through the 1950s, the United States was supported by 
cross-class voluntary associations that tended to make the 
United States a more democratic nation.268  However, since the 
1960s, these cross-class voluntary associations have greatly 
diminished in favor of professionally-run associations supported 
by the money of elites and private foundations.269  This has 
resulted in a crowding out of the issues of middle class and poor 
citizens, she suggests.270 
I have argued in the past that to determine whether a 
nonprofit should be exempt from the corporate income tax, we 
need a theory for why we would apply the income tax to a 
nonprofit corporation in the first place.271  In order to find that 
there is any subsidy to the nonprofit, we must believe that a tax 
should apply to the entity.  There are only two likely theories to 
support the taxation of nonprofits: (1) the shareholder theory, 
and (2) the real entity/regulatory theory.  Neither theory provides 
significant support for taxing charitable organizations as 
currently constructed.  However, both theories generally support 
applying a tax to mutual benefit organizations.  In terms of other 
tax exempt interest groups, I previously argued that trade 
associations do not suffer substantial market failure, and are 
therefore undeserving of a subsidy.272  In that article, I left open 
the possibility that labor unions might be deserving of the 
subsidy.  In Part VI, I turn to analyze that matter. 
 
 
266 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489 (Gerald E. Bevan 
trans., Penguin Books 2003). 
267 THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO 
MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 12 (2003). 
268 Id. at 225–26. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 238–39. 
271 Talk About Tax Exemption, supra note 7, at 187–88. 
272 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 267. 
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VI. ANALYSIS: LABOR UNION TAX TREATMENT ASSESSED UNDER 
A POLITICAL FAIRNESS MODEL 
In addition to economic fairness and efficiency, we should 
consider the value of democracy and, particularly, political voice 
equality in assessing our income tax policy.  Generally, political 
fairness should only be one of many factors for consideration in 
evaluating tax policy.  On most matters of the definition of 
income, for instance, political voice equality should likely play a 
very limited role.  It should play a greater role in a consideration 
of how much progressivity to adopt, as well as the proper rate of 
tax.  However, where tax policy directly impacts political voice 
equality, it should be a major factor in the assessment.  The 
principle of intrinsic equality should not be overridden by 
principles of economic fairness or economic efficiency in these 
circumstances.  Furthermore, given the fundamental nature of 
this right to govern ourselves, we should consider ending any tax 
policy that directly exacerbates political voice inequality. 
By “directly impacts political voice equality,” I mean a tax 
policy that immediately applies to an organization’s or an 
individual’s expression of political voice in our democracy.  Thus, 
on one hand, the deduction of payments or receipts to or from 
political groups, or the taxation of the income of political groups, 
directly impacts political voice equality.  Partnership taxation, on 
the other hand, would generally not directly impact political 
voice equality. 
The taxation of interest group activity directly impacts 
political voice.  Whether you look at the taxation of an 
individual’s payments or receipts to or from an interest group, or 
the taxation of the interest group itself, the choice will either 
encourage or discourage the activity of exercising political voice.  
Thus, on the issue of tax exemption for nonprofits generally, and 
taxation impacting labor unions specifically, I believe we should 
consider the important value of political voice equality. 
In assessing the deductibility of labor union dues and the 
propriety of labor union tax exemption, there are two primary 
questions—one descriptive and one normative:  (1) Does income 
tax policy incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor 
unions?; and (2) Should tax policy incentivize the formation and 
maintenance of labor unions?  The second question can be broken 
into three branches:  (a) In isolation, should we incentivize labor 
unions?; (b) If all other political interest groups are similarly 
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incentivized, should labor unions receive that incentive also?; 
and, finally, (c) Should we incentivize some interests more than 
others? 
On the first question, as I discuss more below, we likely 
penalize the formation and maintenance of labor unions.  As to 
the second question, tax policy should at least be neutral as to 
the matter of interest groups, and could be structured to provide 
additional incentives to labor unions.  This means that if all 
other groups are provided tax exemption and the ability to allow 
their members to deduct dues payments, labor unions and their 
members should be extended the same treatment.  However, 
political fairness would be enhanced by eliminating tax 
exemption for all interest groups and extending the deductibility 
of dues above the line to labor union members.  Finally, although 
there are problems with the final case, we could justify 
eliminating tax exemption for business interests while extending 
it to labor interests.273 
A. Does Income Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity? 
Tax exemption for labor unions and the deductibility of labor 
union dues appear to be the only two tax policies that might 
directly impact labor interests in formation and maintenance.  As 
developed in Part I, it appears that tax exemption provides a 
modest subsidy, but that the deduction of union dues leads to 
something of a penalty to the payment of union dues. 
The government provides a small subsidy to labor unions 
through tax exemption based primarily on deferral of amounts 
that would be deductible in a future year.274  Although small, this 
subsidy is likely enhanced by other state and local tax benefits 
like property tax exemption that often flow from obtaining tax 
exempt status.275  Still, the benefit appears to be available only 
sporadically to the most successful labor unions.  I say 
“sporadically” because unions likely rarely experience profits; it 
is likely that only larger unions are either able to sell products 
 
273 I do not address here how to think about interest groups that are social 
welfare organizations or charitable organizations. The political fairness analysis 
constructed here based on collective action challenges is not as immediately 
applicable to an organization that is generally bankrolled by some wealthy 
individual. I hope to turn to this challenge in a later paper. 
274 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014). 
275 Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit 
Organizations, 28 U. S.F. L. REV. 85, 104–05 (1993). 
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like insurance to its members and nonmembers to generate 
profits, or are able to actually earn investment income.  As tax 
exemption is constructed, the subsidy never reaches those 
interests that face the most severe collective action challenges 
because they never organize. 
As for the deductibility of union dues, we penalize the 
payment of union dues rather than subsidize it.  The normal 
income tax policy provides that the association dues one pays for 
one’s job are deductible from income.  Union dues are technically 
deductible under the Code as a business expense.276  However, 
our income tax treats union dues payments to the worst possible 
treatment, a miscellaneous itemized deduction.277  Given that in 
a normal income tax we would allow the deduction of union dues, 
to primarily deny the deduction is in effect to penalize the 
activity.  In fairness, Congress adopted a generous standard 
deduction to eliminate the need of people to deduct many 
expenses such as union dues.278  However, the fact that union 
dues are considered a miscellaneous itemized deduction further 
penalizes the activity.  Nevertheless, the result of this policy is 
that we do not incentivize the payment of union dues, and could 
be thought to penalize the payment of union dues.  A laborer 
would be better off paying a mortgage and property taxes on his 
house or making a charitable contribution279 than paying union 
dues.  This means that rather than subsidizing the formation of 
labor unions, we discourage the joining of labor unions and 
maintaining union membership. 
The comparison of the labor interest tax treatment to the 
business interest tax treatment is instructive too.  A 
businessman who wants to join a trade association will often be 
able to deduct the trade association amount above the line, thus  
 
 
276 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014). 
277 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(i). 
278 John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the 
Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 203, 205 
(2011). 
279 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012) treats interest deductions and charitable contribution 
deductions as itemized deductions, rather than miscellaneous itemized deductions. 
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guaranteeing the deduction in a large percentage of 
circumstances.280  Thus, we generally encourage the joining of 
business interest groups. 
This comparison point is important in the tax exemption 
sense as well.  We provide business interests the same tax 
exemption opportunity we provide to labor interests.  Because 
the models of business interests can differ greatly from the labor 
interest, it is likely that business interests can make much better 
use of the tax exemption per capita.  Unions primarily generate 
money from member dues.  Those dues are not going to differ 
wildly in amount.  Business interests, though, often charge 
sliding scale fees that allow them to generate particularly big 
contributions from wealthy members.  Additionally, they can sell 
various products such as industry codes that allow them 
significant opportunities for profit.  The American Medical 
Association (“AMA”) for instance controls and sells the very 
profitable codes for medical billing associated with Medicare.281  
This means business interest’s members are not penalized for 
making contributions to a trade association, and that business 
interests themselves are likely able to generate a larger more 
regular benefit from tax exemption.  Thus, we incentivize 
business interests to form interest groups more than we do labor 
interests. 
B. Should Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity? 
That brings us to the second question.  Should we use income 
tax policy to incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor 
unions?  This question has three subquestions:  (i) In isolation, 
should we incentivize labor unions?; (ii) If we incentivize other 
interest groups, should we incentivize labor interests too?; and 
(iii) Would we be better off with a neutral system where all 
interest groups face the same level of taxation or should, and can, 
we build a system where some interests are incentivized over 
others?  In each instance, tax exemption is considered first, and 
then the case of the deductibility of union dues. 
 
280 With many business interests being either entities or employers or small 
businessmen their right to deduct is found in 26 U.S.C.A. § 62 (West 2014), meaning 
they are ensured the deduction from gross income. 
281 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 321 (discussing the AMA’s 
sale of Current Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines how any 
medical procedure is reimbursed by Medicare). 
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1. Labor Union Incentives in Isolation 
Labor union revenue appears to bear all the characteristics 
of taxable income.  A union is a separately recognized, 
independent entity that carries on an activity that would be 
taxed like any other business.  While some have argued that 
charitable organizations do not earn income in the sense we 
think of income within the income tax,282 no one makes that 
claim as to a labor union.  Thus, in absence of some good 
rationale, labor union income should generally be taxed.  None of 
the current theories of tax exemption provide a strong case to 
support tax exemption for labor unions, or labor interests 
generally. 
We could approach the question of whether a labor union 
deserves income tax exemption from an economic efficiency 
perspective.  The best support for such a case in nonprofit tax 
exemption rationales is likely Hansmann’s contract failure 
theory based in an economic efficiency rationale.  Labor interests 
face a contract failure because of the collective action problem 
common to large groups where the return from joining is 
relatively small compared to the cost of joining.  Additionally, 
labor unions are created in the nonprofit form such that they 
undergo some capital constraints.  However, along with the fact 
that Hansmann’s theory provides no real limiting principle,283 
many explicitly make the case that labor unions are harmful in 
an economic efficiency sense.284  We could get into a battle over 
the economic efficiency impact of labor unions, but I believe there 
is a more satisfying rationale based in the political fairness of the 
matter. 
Weisbrod’s government failure theory has some promise too.  
Perhaps labor union services are services that the government 
does not provide, but are something a group of our society who 
are not a majority desires.  This is not a perfect fit either.  Labor 
unions are not an end good that might be provided by 
government, but more of a government process in and of itself.  
Even if we could find that labor unions provide a good that the 
government fails to provide, this theory offers no reason for why 
 
282 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 307–14, 333. 
283 Cf. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 2017, 2066–67 (2007) (arguing for-profit organizations deserve a subsidy for 
carrying out charitable works just like nonprofit organizations). 
284 See supra note 2. 
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we should believe this good should be supported by government.  
Again, considering the situation from the political fairness angle 
should offer some greater support. 
Perhaps we could try to build a case for labor unions based 
on a quid pro quo theory that labor unions provide some concrete 
economic benefits to society.  The difficulty with this path is that 
there is evidence on the outcomes of unions on our society that 
point in different directions.  Some say unions help in growth and 
in protecting laborers, while others find that they harm our 
economy while protecting only a select few laborers. 
Finally, there may be something in the pluralist argument.  
Nonprofit organizations enhance the number of voices we find in 
our political system, and thereby improve the deliberations of our 
representative bodies by increasing the amount of political 
voices.  However, the claim of pluralism has never been deeply 
developed. 
The pluralist argument is based on a facile model of group-
based democracy.285  This vision of pluralism suggests we 
encourage every interest to form to bring all possible voices to the 
government.  However, that case ignores the collective action 
problem.  Interests face varying levels of difficulty in organizing 
and maintaining status and action.  This means the provision of 
a subsidy through exemption will likely never go to the groups 
that arguably need it the most.  The pluralist rationale also 
ignores a lesser but important factor—whether groups represent 
the “true” interests of the group members.  Both theoretical and 
empirical scholarship have shown that it is unlikely that groups 
fulfill this role in a way we might hope.  Those who argue that we 
should support the entire nonprofit sector with tax exemption 
because it will enhance “pluralism” fail to acknowledge these 
deep imperfections. 
Nevertheless, although the nonprofit pluralists are 
misguided in part, their instincts are right.  Much of our 
nonprofit sector plays a significant role in our democratic 
structure.  Social welfare organizations, labor unions, and 
business leagues are all arguably primarily involved in shaping 
our democracy as interest groups.286  Because of issues of 
numerosity, individual citizens are rarely able to participate in 
 
285 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 270–72. 
286 Charitable organizations do too, but do not typically do so in a primary sense. 
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setting the agenda in our democracy of items for final votes.  As 
discussed above, interest groups tend to fill this important 
democratic role on behalf of citizens.  Thus, getting policy right 
regarding these nonprofit organizations might be less about 
economic efficiency, and more about getting democracy right.  I 
argue we should consider a neo-pluralist case for supporting 
interest groups through tax exemption. 
A major assumption of this case is that we should strive for 
democracy rather than anarchy or guardianship.  While this 
assumption may seem self-evident, it is anything but.  Founding 
fathers, such as Madison and Hamilton, were deeply drawn to 
some form of guardianship as the best form of government.  The 
Founders were particularly fearful of the laborers and farmers 
exercising majoritarian power and tried to design our system of 
representation to ensure mostly only “qualified individuals” 
represented our people.  This is ultimately what Federalist 10 is 
about.  Many continue to distrust the poor and working class to 
participate in governing our democracy.  This is seen in efforts to 
limit voting rights as well as arguments that voters are not 
educated well enough to vote.  Additionally, while we may not 
think of the United States as a strong bastion of anarchism, 
there is a strong libertarian streak in this country that argues for 
as limited a government as possible.  That libertarian streak is 
well expressed in those who would like to see the market control 
most matters of distribution of goods and services.  If you support 
either of these cases, you are unlikely to agree with my case. 
However, if you believe in the principle of intrinsic equality 
discussed in Part II—that most adults have more right to govern 
themselves than anyone else—then you should also generally 
believe in the case for democracy.  Accepting the principle of 
intrinsic equality comes with a corollary that each of us should 
have a right to participate in the governance of our group affairs.  
Such a belief could lead to the idealistic notion of pure 
democracy.  Under that system, to be true to the principle of 
intrinsic equality we would need to ensure that everyone 
impacted by a group decision had the right to help set the agenda 
of the group, receive information about the issues before the 
group, help to provide information about the decisions before the 
group, and have a right to vote on all final decisions.  Obviously,  
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as discussed in Parts II and III, we know the world has never 
seen a pure democracy, and there are reasons to believe it is 
unrealistic. 
Still, as discussed in Part III, our notion of a democracy is 
generally a polyarchy where certain critical rights such as 
freedom of speech, association, and the right to regular free and 
fair elections have become what we expect from democracy.  
Factors such as size of the country or population, and differences 
in wealth or ability, all create significant obstacles to pure 
democracy, but also to a polyarchy.  Ensuring equal political 
voice becomes almost an impossibility under these 
circumstances.  But this does not mean we should not strive for 
more political voice equality in our democracy. 
While groups may not provide the perfect answer to this 
problem of political voice inequality, it seems at least that they 
are a part of a solution.  For many people, groups provide their 
only real opportunity to have a seat at the agenda-setting table.  
And, the evidence is strong that labor interests are significantly 
underrepresented.287  For the most part, laborers do not have a 
seat at the agenda-setting table.  Blue-collar workers and the 
poor are thoroughly outgunned in the interest group sector by the 
interests of executives and management and business 
generally.288  As demonstrated in Part III.A, this is true whether 
we look at interest group numbers, congressional hearing 
testimony, or money spent on lobbying. 
Whether this representation identifies a disparity in result is 
beside the point.  The political fairness model I propose focuses 
on maximizing a social choice function, rather than a social 
welfare function.  In a democracy, we should strive to ensure 
actual representation at the table of government.  Labor is not at 
the table.  Under these circumstances, it is reasonable and just to 
ensure that our tax system is not operated in a way to hinder the 
formation of labor interests.  Given the enormous disparity in 
representation, it also seems reasonable and just to try to 
subsidize such interests through the tax system. 
Following this idea to its logical extreme might be 
unworkable, though.  To push the idea further, where a distinct 
political interest faces substantial collective action problems, we 
 
287 See supra Part III. 
288 See supra Part III.B. 
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could strive to aid those interests to organize and maintain 
interest groups based on some sliding scale of collective action 
difficulty.  The principle though is neither practical nor 
administrable.  It suggests that Congress or an agency should 
assess the relative collective action challenge an interest faces 
before providing a subsidy.  Depending on the size of the group, 
the education of interested parties, and the capital resources 
available, we might ratchet up and down some scale that the 
subsidy provided.  We could even conceivably impose a tax on the 
activity of interests that face no collective action problem to 
hinder particularly powerful interests. 
Adopting such a detailed system is likely to be less than 
optimal when administrability, complexity, and political matters 
are considered.  In assessing an optimal commodity taxation 
system where tax rose and fell based on the relative elasticity of 
goods, Professor Eric Zolt concluded that such a system would 
have too many informational demands, too much added 
complexity, and likely political problems.289  A subsidy based on 
the relative collective action problem of interests would face 
similar problems.  Given these constraints, if we wanted to build 
such a system, we are probably better off making calls based on 
rough justice regarding broad categories of groups, as Congress 
has in effect already done. 
If we look at labor union tax exemption in isolation, under a 
rough justice, neo-pluralist view, the case for tax exemption for 
unions seems, at first glance, strong.  Given that labor interests 
suffer a significant collective action problem and are poorly 
represented in the interest group eco-system, there would seem 
to be good reason to try to enhance their ability to organize and 
maintain unions. 
However, if we are looking at labor interests in isolation, 
that is, not taking into consideration other interests such as 
business interests, we might find a more troubling picture.  The 
subsidy of tax exemption is not targeted towards the interests 
that need it the most.  We would assist from year-to-year a very 
narrow sector of the labor market.  Even with the exemption, 
unions will likely be a highly selective group of employees that 
happen to be in sectors of the economy or country that are more 
conducive to unions than others.  While it may help some 
 
289 Zolt, supra note 32, at 66–67. 
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inchoate unions to organize and then maintain status, it probably 
works to provide greater aid to those organizations that were 
more likely to organize in the first place.  Thus, standing in 
isolation without considering the role of other groups in our 
democracy and the incentives provided to them, it is hard to say 
one way or the other whether a subsidy should be provided to 
labor unions alone.  I return to this question again in the final 
part of the analysis in considering whether we should provide the 
subsidy to labor when we take the subsidy away from buiness 
interests. 
What about the case for allowing the deductibility of union 
dues?  Because the basic income tax case for deductibility of 
union dues is so strong, it’s hard to imagine another justification.  
However, given that union dues relate directly to political voice 
equality, denying the deduction should be expected to cause 
significant political unfairness.  That inequality deepens when 
we recognize that laborers face significant collective action 
problems in organizing to protect their interests.  The neo-
pluralist case, thus, strongly backs up the case to provide a 
deduction for this expenditure.  Perhaps, the ability to deduct 
does not give a tax benefit to all who we might like; however, it 
would seem odd to deny such a group of people this deduction. 
2. Exemption to Unions When Other Interests Are Extended 
Exemption 
In a world where other interests are subsidized through tax 
exemption—this describes current tax policy—the case for 
providing a similar tax exemption to labor interests becomes 
strong.  For instance, it would be highly questionable to provide 
tax exemption to business and not to labor.  Such a policy would 
exacerbate political voice inequality that exists naturally 
between business and labor.  Thus, where business interests are 
provided tax exemption, the neo-pluralist case would mean we 
must provide the same right to labor.  Failing to do so should be 
expected to decrease the social choice function by reducing the 
voice of laborers in our democracy. 
Again, as in the prior case, it is hard to imagine an argument 
prohibiting the deduction of labor union dues.  Where other 
interests may deduct such amounts, the case for allowing the 
deduction of labor union dues would seem inescapable.  Doing 
otherwise would seem to be democratically suspect.  Again, the 
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choice to enhance the voice of business interests but not labor 
interests should be expected to reduce the social choice function 
in our democracy by systematically reducing the voice of labor.290  
Such an unequal subsidy for political representation seems 
antithetical to a balanced democracy. 
Thus, if other interests receive tax exemption and 
deductibility of interest group dues, labor unions should receive 
the same treatment.  This case may even provide a justification 
for prohibiting the deduction of business interest dues, along 
with any other interest that does not experience significant 
collective action challenges.  We already deny the deduction of 
political contributions and explicit lobbying payments.291  In a 
sense, a denial of business interest group dues could be an 
extension of that policy.  I turn to this question in Section 3. 
3. Incentivize Labor Interests While Denying the Incentive to 
Others 
Where other interests are not subsidized through tax 
exemption and are unable to deduct interest group dues, how 
should we treat labor interests?  To simplify this analysis, I 
compare only the case of business interests and labor interests.  
Under this scenario, we could either choose to deny tax 
exemption to labor too, or exempt labor alone.  We are able to 
reasonably consider the taxing labor scenario in full in this 
simplified analysis.  This is because it treats everyone the same 
by imposing the same taxing structure on all interest groups, 
their members, and their potential members.  The simplified 
analysis for incentivizing labor and only comparing that to 
business does not give us a complete picture.  I hope in a future 
article to consider more of the interest group sector in both social 
welfare organizations and charitable organizations to more fully 
consider this complex analysis.  Finally, in each case, I assume 
we want to increase the social choice function and that we take 
political fairness in a democracy sense into consideration of this 
tax policy because it directly impacts political voice equality. 
 
290 Obviously comparing only labor against business interests is a simplistic 
analysis. We would need to throw in all sorts of other issues in order to have a full 
sense of justice. However, the choices made in the Code are almost always some sort 
of rough justice, and comparing labor to business provides us a simplistic way at 
getting to this rough justice. 
291 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(e) (West 2014). 
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If what we want is government neutrality on the matter of 
tax exemption, we should tax labor interests when business 
interests are taxed.  This would mean all income used to support 
labor and business interests, whether those interests are 
organized or remain unorganized, would face the same tax 
structure choices currently offered by the Internal Revenue Code.  
Such a change would mean either that we treat such 
organizations as taxable corporations or treat them as 
cooperatives taxable under Subchapter T.  Those that never 
organize would simply pay taxes on income that they might have 
put towards organizing. 
The key to this neo-pluralist case is that it would be a 
positive democratic move to treat both interests as taxable rather 
than tax-exempt.  On the one hand, the subsidy of tax exemption 
is given currently to business interests even though the vast 
majority of those interests are well-represented and face little in 
the way of collective action problems.  They would organize 
whether there was a subsidy or not.  The subsidy to them is a 
windfall and those interests are best placed to capture and use 
the subsidy.  Labor, on the other hand, is not well represented in 
a political voice sense, and is little able to make use of the 
subsidy even when available.  Taxing both interests would place 
both interests in the same relative position. 
If we implemented such a change, labor unions would likely 
pay little to no tax because they likely have little to no earnings.  
Business interests would likely pay some tax associated with 
their activities.  Treating business and labor interests alike in 
this way would be to treat the two in a tax neutral matter. 
The neutral policy on dues would likely be to deny the dues 
deduction to labor interests when business interests are denied 
the deduction.  Anyone engaging in interest group activity would 
bear tax on their individual or entity level tax they otherwise 
would owe.  As it stands, the current policy primarily supports 
the interest of businessmen.  As noted above, Congress already 
treats political campaign expenditures and lobbying expenditures 
as non-deductible personal ones.  There is no reason we could not 
extend that notion into this very similar realm.  Given that most 
laborers are unable to take this deduction anyway, this would do 
little to no harm to the labor union movement.  It would also 
move the government to a more neutral stance by not 
incentivizing the business association interests over that of labor. 
MPP_HACKNEY 12/18/2017  9:27 AM 
2017] PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? 379 
The more difficult question in a justice sense is whether to 
provide labor interests tax exemption and allow labor union 
members the ability to deduct union dues, while denying the 
same to business interests. 
Although the subsidy for labor unions through tax exemption 
is neither great in amount nor well-tailored, even marginal 
improvements in the labor interest representation should 
enhance our democracy because it would likely increase the 
social choice function.  If the modest subsidy administered in the 
absence of a business interest subsidy results in even a couple 
extra unions representing some group of laborers we would likely 
have more individuals with a seat at the table for agenda-setting 
and decision making.  Still, denying the deduction to business 
interests would likely lead to fewer business interests obtaining 
representation as well, which would result in some lessening of 
the social choice function.  How do we reconcile that? 
While it seems difficult to compare the results of this change 
in policy, given the relative collective action problems of the two 
different groups, it seems likely that business interests would 
still be more generally represented before federal, state and local 
governments than labor interests even after losing tax 
exemption.  Studies of the impact of removing exemption could be 
useful.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that labor 
interests are so hampered, while business interests are so 
advantaged in comparison, that it is likely that providing the 
subsidy to labor and not business would be social choice function 
enhancing.  Thus, I argue, we could legitimately maintain tax 
exemption for labor interests in this case.  For the reasons set 
forth in Part VI.B.1 though, the case is not a strong one.  There 
are many interests who will never obtain the benefit of the 
subsidy. 
A stronger case can be made for allowing employees to 
deduct labor union dues above the line while simultaneously 
denying that right to business association members.  Allowing a 
deduction for labor union dues would be targeted exactly to 
encourage membership in a union.  This means this deduction 
would be tailored to the choice of an employee to join and stay in 
a labor union.  Providing this subsidy while denying it to 
business interests could again increase the social choice function, 
although still with the caveats listed above.  Still, providing the 
deduction to labor would not reach the interests that never 
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organize and this creates its own political voice equality 
problems.  We may just be highlighting the voices of laborers who 
already had a voice in the first place. 
If someone were still inclined to try to utilize the exemption 
and the deduction to enhance the social choice function, there is 
still one other area to at least consider.  Can we constitutionally 
limit—or equalize—interest group expenditures through the tax 
system to limit the power of wealthy voices—or equalize the 
voices of everyone else?292  As noted in Part III, while the 
fundamental rights—freedom of speech, free and fair elections—
of a polyarchy are there to make political voice equality possible, 
they do not work to make it a reality.  While our Constitution 
promises one person, one vote, and ensures freedom of speech 
and association, it does not explicitly speak to establishing a 
system to provide political voice equality.  This is the debate we 
see in campaign finance.  Those who advocate for campaign 
finance regulations often point out the harmful effect of wealth 
on our democracy because it makes wealthy individuals’ voices so 
much more powerful than those of every day Americans.  With 
that said, the Supreme Court does not recognize equality as a 
rationale for imposing campaign finance limitations.293 
In Buckley v. Valeo the Court stated: 
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which 
was designed “to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources’ ”and “ ‘to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.’ ”294 
Whether this opinion and its progeny puts a roadblock on how 
the tax system is used to subsidize certain interests is an 
important question that needs examination.  I provide here only 
initial thoughts. 
 
 
292 RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 74–89 (2016); LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 58–70 (1st ed. 2012) (considering this question with respect 
to campaign contributions within campaign finance law). 
293 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976). 
294 Id. at 48–49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 
(1964)). 
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The lesson of collective action theory and the empirical work 
on interest group structure is that not all interests are created 
equally.  Neutrality as to these matters means that some 
interests will necessarily have a much louder voice at the table of 
government than others.  Many will have no voice at all.  The 
attitude of the Buckley Court on the First Amendment may very 
well be the intent of the Framers, but it fails miserably as a 
matter of achieving a stronger democracy and justice.295  How 
does this opinion impact deductions and exemptions from tax? 
The Court’s use of the limits on equality principle as a 
justification seems to be focused on provisions that either limit 
campaign expenditures or limit campaign contributions.  
Providing a deduction or not, and providing tax exemption or not, 
has not been seen by the Court as the type of limitation that 
campaign finance applies.  In Cammarano v. United States, the 
Court found that denying a deduction for lobbying expenses 
harmed no First Amendment interest.296  Furthermore, in 
examining the question of whether a charitable organization 
could be limited in its ability to lobby, the Court in Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation again found no First Amendment 
interest violated by limiting tax exemption based on the activity 
of lobbying.297  The Court held that there was no equal protection 
issue in subsidizing one interest more than another, such as 
when Congress grants the benefit of accepting tax deductible 
charitable contributions to veterans organizations, but not to 
social welfare organizations.298  Thus, it appears that the Court 
has thus far willingly allowed tax exemption and tax deductions 
to be established with political activity in mind. 
This suggests that if Congress chooses to treat all interests 
equally, it can.  If it wants to subsidize some activity more than 
another, it can do that too.  It seems like the most difficult issue 
 
295 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 58, at 360 (“The Court fails to recognize the 
essential point that the fair value of the political liberties is required for a just 
political procedure, and that to insure their fair value it is necessary to prevent 
those with greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization which 
accompany them, from controlling the electoral process to their advantage.”). 
296 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512–13 (1959). 
297 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 61 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983). 
298 Id. at 550–51; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1064, 1071 (2014) (noting that 
such a distinction is constitutional as long as the government has a rational basis, 
and further finding this Taxation with Representation distinction limiting speech is 
also constitutional because there is no lesser means of accomplishing the limitation). 
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is whether it could subsidize some interest greater than 
another.299  In other words, could it legitimately choose to 
subsidize labor more than business interests, or vice versa.  
Justice and democracy demand that Congress be allowed to give 
a helping hand to interests that face great challenges in 
projecting their voice in our democracy.  I leave for another time 
whether the Constitution permits that choice.  However, 
Congress has at its disposal the ability to make a political voice 
equality enhancing move by removing tax exemption from labor 
and business and by taxing the dues of both labor and interest.  
Another possible social choice function-enhancing move would be 
to provide labor union members a deduction above the line for 
union dues to equalize the treatment of business and labor 
interests that are now out of balance in favor of business 
interests.  Under the neo-pluralist case current tax policy on 
labor interests come up wanting. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the focus of this Article is on one small sector of the 
tax world, laborers as an interest group, it uses that sector to 
argue we should consider political fairness as a factor in tax 
policy.  It demonstrates that current policy on tax exemption 
likely harms social choice function by enhancing the voice of 
business and diminishing the voice of labor.  Although 
traditionally we examine tax policy by considering its economic 
fairness and efficiency, I argue we should consider the value of 
political fairness when a tax policy directly implicates political 
voice.  In the case of labor union activity the tax policy of tax 
exemption and the deduction of union dues directly impact 
political voice. 
A fundamental tenet of this political fairness analysis I 
propose is that it focus on a social choice function.  I contend that 
the social choice function is key in this analysis because our tax 
policy should be democracy enhancing rather than democracy 
detracting.  The primary question to ask therefore is whether a 
particular policy increases political voice equality.  Current policy  
 
 
299 Regan v. Taxation with Representation suggests at least that this should pass 
constitutional muster. 61 U.S. at 548–49. 
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on both exemption and the deduction of union dues likely 
decreases political voice equality.  We should therefore look to 
change tax policy towards labor unions. 
This Article presents a neo-pluralist justification for the 
exemption from income tax provided for interest groups.  The 
original pluralism justification suggested we should support any 
and all nonprofit organizations, no matter the cause, in order to 
enhance our democracy.  The neo-pluralist justification 
recognizes the deep impact of the collective action problem on the 
interests in our society.  In particular, those interests that are 
vast in number, poor in wealth, and limited in political skill are 
likely to face great difficulty in organizing to represent their 
interests before our governments.  Conversely, those interests 
that are smaller, wealthy, and endowed with political skill are 
likely to face little difficulty in organizing to represent their 
interests.  This collective action problem is a significant 
hindrance to advancing democracy.  Interest groups are 
significant representatives of peoples’ interests.  We should not 
adopt policies that make that democratic failure worse. 
Currently, the Code appears to treat business and labor 
interests exactly the same under tax-exemption.  Business 
interests can form nonprofit tax-exempt organizations to further 
their interests, and labor interests and the poor can do the same.  
However, because of the problem of collective action, this system 
overwhelmingly helps out the business interests and leaves the 
interests of the workingman behind.  We would enhance political 
voice equality by ending exemption generally for labor unions 
and trade associations.  Although the case is not strong and is 
subject to problems, we could legitimately choose to maintain it 
for labor.  Additionally, current policy that allows business 
interests to deduct dues, but limits labor interests from 
deducting the same, is unjust and harmful to our democracy.  We 
should either allow labor union members to deduct their union 
dues above the line, or prohibit business interests from deducting 
these expenses like we do to most labor union members.  Either 
choice would be preferable to current policy. 
 
